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Informed Trading and False Signaling with Open Market Repurchases 
Jesse M. Fried* 
Abstract 
  Public companies in the United States and elsewhere increasingly use open mar-
ket stock buybacks, rather than dividends, to distribute cash to shareholders. Aca-
demic commentators have emphasized the possible benefits of such repurchases for 
shareholders. However, little attention has been paid to their potential drawbacks. 
This Article explains that managers currently are able to use open market repurchases 
and misleading repurchase announcements to enrich themselves at public sharehold-
ers’ expense.  Managers, aware their stock is underpriced, frequently use repurchases 
to indirectly buy stock for themselves at a bargain price. Managers have also been able 
to boost stock prices by announcing repurchase programs they did not intend to exe-
cute, perhaps to unload their own shares at a high price. Such bargain repurchases and 
inflated-price sales systematically transfer significant amounts of value from one set of 
shareholders (public investors) to another (managers).  Low-price buybacks are also 
likely to reduce aggregate shareholder value by distorting managers’ payout and in-
vestment decisions, further reducing public shareholder returns. The Article con-
cludes by proposing a new approach to regulating open market repurchases: 
requiring managers to disclose specific details of the firm’s buy orders in advance. 
This pre-repurchase disclosure rule would undermine managers’ ability to use repur-
chases for informed trading and false signaling, thereby reducing the resulting distor-
tions and costs to shareholders.  Moreover, it would achieve these objectives without 
eroding any of the potential benefits of repurchases.  
Previously circulated under the title “Share Repurchases and Managerial Opportunism”. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
  Publicly traded U.S. firms distribute between $300 and $400 billion to their 
own shareholders annually.1 Managers have two options for paying out this cash: 
dividends—pro rata distributions to shareholders—or share repurchases. Until the 
early 1980s, 80% to 90% of cash payouts took the form of dividends.2 However, the 
use of share repurchases to distribute cash has since grown substantially in the 
United States, increasing from $6.6 billion in 1980 to almost $200 billion in 2000.3 
In that year, more than 50% of the cash paid out by publicly traded firms was dis-
tributed through stock buybacks.4 The focus of this Article is open market repur-
chases, the most common form of buybacks, in which a corporation uses a broker 
to acquire its own stock in the public market over an extended period of time.5 
                                                                                                                                                             
1   See Gustavo Grullon & Roni Michaely, Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution 
Hypothesis, 57 J. FIN. 1649, 1655 (2002) [hereinafter Grullon & Michaely, Dividends]. 
2  Id. 
3   Id.; Gustavo Grullon & David L. Ikenberry, What Do We Know About Stock Repurchases?, 13 
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 31, 33 (2000).  Although the volume of stock repurchases began 
declining after 2000, it began picking up again in 2004, with firms announcing over $170 
billion worth of repurchases in first eight months of the year, nearly double the corresponding 
figure for 2003. See Cynthia Schreiber, Moving the Market: Tracking the Numbers/Street Sleuth: 
Buybacks Make A Grand Comeback, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2004, at C3.    
4 See Gustavo Grullon & Roni Michaely, The Information Content of Share Repurchase Programs, 
59 J. FIN. 651, 651 (2004) [hereinafter Grullon & Michaely, The Information Consent].  
5 See Grullon & Ikenberry, supra note 3, at 33-34. This Article is part of a larger project on 
firms’ use of share repurchases to acquire stock from public shareholders. See Jesse M. Fried,  
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  The explosive growth of repurchases has attracted considerable attention from 
financial economists.6 In general, these economists have assumed that managers 
                                                                                                                                                             
Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 453-
65 (2000) (showing that managers’ tendering, selling, and disclosure behavior is consistent 
with the use of repurchase tender offers for insider trading) [hereinafter Fried, Insider 
Signaling]; Jesse M. Fried, Open Market Repurchases: Signaling or Managerial Opportunism?, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 865, 879-81 (2001) (demonstrating that managers do not use open 
market repurchases to signal that the stock is underpriced) [hereinafter Fried, Open Market].  
The Article does not discuss the repurchase of shares from select shareholders (including 
greenmail transactions). Nor does it address repurchases by closed-end investment funds, 
which raise different issues than repurchases by operating companies and are governed by a 
different set of regulations. See TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, 3 THE 
REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS: MUTUAL FUNDS AND ADVISERS § 26.03 (2d ed. 2001 & 
Supp. 2004) (discussing closed-end investment companies that sell and repurchase their 
securities). 
 
6 See, e.g., SCOTT J. WEISBENNER, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, CORPORATE SHARE 
REPURCHASES IN THE 1990S: WHAT ROLE DO STOCK OPTIONS PLAY? 16 (Apr. 2000), available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2000/200029/200029pap.pdf; Michael J. 
Barclay & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Corporate Payout Policy: Cash Dividends Versus Open-Market 
Repurchases, 22 J. FIN. ECON. 61 (1988); Eli Bartov, Open-Market Stock Repurchases as Signals 
for Earnings and Risk Changes, 14 J. ACCT. & ECON. 275 (1991); F.H. Buckley, When the Medium 
is the Message: Corporate Buybacks as Signals, 65 IND. L.J. 493, 539 (1990); Bhagwan 
Chowdhry & Vikram Nanda, Repurchase Premia as a Reason for Dividends: A Dynamic Model of 
Corporate Payout Policies, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 321 (1994); George W. Fenn & Nellie Liang, 
Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial Stock Incentives, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 45 (2001); Grullon & 
Ikenberry, supra note 3; Grullon & Michaely, supra note 1; Grullon & Michaely, supra note 4; 
David Ikenberry et al., Market Underreaction to Open Market Share Repurchases, 39 J. FIN. 
ECON. 181 (1995) [hereinafter Ikenberry et al., Market Underreaction]; David Ikenberry et al., 
Stock Repurchases in Canada: Performance and Strategic Trading, 55 J. FIN. 2372 (2000); Murali 
Jagannathan et al., Financial Flexibility and the Choice Between Dividends and Stock Repurchases, 
57 J. FIN. ECON. 355 (1999) [hereinafter Jagannathan et al., Financial Flexibility]; Murali 
Jagannathan & Clifford Stephens, Motives for Multiple Open-Market Repurchase Programs, 32 
FIN. MGMT. 71 (2003); Kathleen M. Kahle, When a Buyback Isn’t a Buyback: Open Market 
Repurchases and Employee Options, 63 J. FIN. ECON. 235 (2002); Elias Raad & H.K. Wu, Insider  
3 
use repurchases to benefit shareholders and have sought to identify the possible 
advantages of repurchases over dividends. These include repurchases’ ability to: 
(1) distribute excess cash more tax-efficiently than dividends; (2) pay out transient 
cash flows more cost-effectively than dividends; (3) acquire shares for use in em-
ployee stock option plans; and (4) boost liquidity.7  However, little attention has 
been paid to the potential economic costs to public shareholders of managers using 
repurchases, rather than dividends, to distribute cash.  
  The Article shows that managers8 commonly use open market buybacks to en-
rich themselves at public investors’ expense. The Article demonstrates that a re-
purchase has the same economic effects as the following two-part transaction: (1) 
non-selling shareholders buy shares directly from sellers at the repurchase price; 
and (2) the firm then issues a dividend.  Thus, when a stock is trading below its ac-
tual value, managers can use a repurchase to buy shares for themselves and other 
                                                                                                                                                             
Trading Effects on Stock Returns Around Open-Market Repurchase Announcements: An Empirical 
Study, 18 J. FIN. RES. 45, 57 (1995); Clifford P. Stephens & Michael S. Weisbach, Actual Share 
Reacquisitions in Open Market Repurchase Programs, 53 J. FIN. 313 (1998); Nikos Vafeas, 
Determinants of the Choice Between Alternative Share Repurchase Methods, 12 J. ACCT. AUDITING 
& FIN. 101 (1997); Konan Chan et al., Do Firms Knowingly Repurchase Stock For Good 
Reason? (Aug. 2001) (working paper), available at 
http://www.ruf.rice.edu/%7Ejgspaper/W_Ikenberry_insiderv6.pdf; Christine Jolls, Stock 
Repurchases and Incentive Compensation (Mar. 1998) (Working Paper No. 6467), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6467.  
7   The potential benefits of repurchases are described infra Part I.B.  
4 
non-selling shareholders at a bargain price.  Managers of repurchasing firms own, 
on average, 15% to 20% of their firms’ outstanding shares.9  As a result, managers 
repurchasing underpriced stock capture a significant fraction of the value trans-
ferred from sellers.  Indeed, as the Article explains, there is considerable evidence 
that managers frequently use private information to conduct repurchase shares at 
a bargain price.10  
  Some economists have argued that managers seeking to serve public 
shareholders use repurchase announcements to signal that their stock is under-
priced. According to this account, which I call “faithful signaling,” managers who 
believe that their stock is underpriced and who wish to credibly communicate this 
belief to shareholders do so by promising to repurchase stock and retain their own 
shares.  Managers making this double commitment essentially promise to indi-
rectly buy shares at the repurchase price – which would make them worse off if, in 
fact, the stock is currently overpriced.  
                                                                                                                                                             
8 In this Article, I use the term “managers” to refer to a firm’s high-level executives, directors, 
and (if there is one) the controlling shareholder that has appointed them.  
9 See infra Part II.A.1 
10 See infra Part II.A.2.  
5 
The Article presents empirical data indicating that managers do not actually 
engage in faithful signaling. Indeed, these same data suggest that managers engage 
in what I call “false signaling:” they announce repurchases they have no intention 
of conducting to inflate the stock price, enabling them to unload their own shares 
at a higher price.  The Article also explains that bargain repurchases and false sig-
naling are synergetic.  Bargain repurchases make it easier for managers to boost 
the stock price with misleading repurchase announcements. And false signaling 
makes it easier for managers to profit from bargain repurchases.  
  The Article demonstrates that managers’ opportunistic use of repurchases and 
misleading repurchase announcements is likely to impose substantial costs on pub-
lic shareholders.  I estimate that managers make as much as several billion dollars 
annually from bargain repurchases alone.  And I show that each dollar of these 
profits comes, directly or indirectly, at public shareholders’ expense. 
  The fact that managers use nonpublic information to conduct bargain repur-
chases should not be surprising.  After all, managers frequently employ inside in-
formation to trade personally in their own firms’ shares. For example, managers 
often buy firm stock in advance of good news and sell before the release of bad  
6 
news. In earlier work, I estimated that managers use private information to make 
about $5 billion annually, trading personally in their own firms’ shares.11   
  There is, however, a critical difference between managers’ own trading and the 
use of bargain repurchases to indirectly acquire stock at a low price. Unlike man-
agers’ personal buying and selling, their use of repurchases to exploit inside infor-
mation  requires them to manipulate the timing and form of corporate cash 
payouts. Therefore, managers’ ability to use repurchases to buy stock at a bargain 
price  generates more  costs  that  personal  insider trading: it can directly distort 
payout policy, shrinking the corporate pie and further reducing public sharehold-
ers’ returns.  
  The Article shows that bargain repurchases can lead to three types of payout 
distortions. First, managers able to use repurchases for informed trading may have 
an incentive to hoard cash – that is, delay paying out cash when an immediate dis-
tribution would benefit shareholders as a group. In particular, managers who be-
lieve that their firm’s stock is likely to become underpriced may have an incentive 
to retain cash to preserve their ability to conduct bargain repurchases even though 
an immediate payout would maximize aggregate shareholder value. In this sce-
nario, managers’ ability to use repurchases to buy stock at a bargain price causes 
them to pay out too little. 
   Second, managers aware that their stock is underpriced may have an incen-
tive to squander cash --   that is buy back stock with cash that should, from an ag-
                                                                                                                                                             
11  See Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading 
Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 323 (1998) [hereinafter Fried, Reducing the Profitability].    
7 
gregate shareholder perspective, be invested in the firm. In this second scenario, 
managers’ ability to  conduct bargain repurchases  causes them to pay out too 
much.  In both the cash-hoarding and cash-squandering scenarios, managers’ abil-
ity to engage in bargain repurchases leads them to make payout decisions that re-
duce aggregate shareholder value.  
  Third, managers’ ability to use repurchases for informed trading may distort 
their choice of payout mechanism. As the Article explains, the transaction costs of 
a repurchase may sometimes exceed those of a dividend by a substantial amount, 
making dividends the most efficient form of payout in certain situations. But man-
agers’ incentive to profit from a low-price buyback may cause them to use a repur-
chase even in those situations where a dividend would be more efficient.12 
  I then consider two arguments that bargain repurchases might actually im-
prove payout policy and increase aggregate shareholder value: (1) that such re-
purchases might mitigate managers’ tendency to retain excess cash; and (2) that 
repurchase announcements’ generally positive effect on stock prices suggests that 
bargain repurchases benefit shareholders.  I explain why bargain repurchases are 
unlikely to benefit shareholders by causing managers to reducing excess cash re-
tention, and show that bargain repurchases’ effects on stockholders as a group 
                                                                                                                                                             
12  Managers’ use of bargain repurchases might give rise to other costs as well.  For example, 
bargain repurchsaes, like personal insider trading, can be profitable only to the extent 
managers have private information.  Thus bargain repurchases, like personal insider trading, 
might lead managers to make investment and disclosure decisions designed to increase 
information asymmetry rather than maximize aggregate shareholder value.  Cf.  Fried, 
Reducing the Profitability, supra note 11, at 306.  However, the focus of this article is on those 
costs and distortions that are unique to bargain repurchases.   
8 
cannot be inferred from the stock market’s reaction to repurchase announcement.  
Indeed, I demonstrate that repurchase announcements could boost the stock price 
even in a world where all repurchases reduce aggregate shareholder value. 
  After analyzing the costs bargain repurchases and misleading repurchase an-
nouncements impose on public shareholders, the Article proposes a new approach 
to regulating open market repurchases designed to reduce these costs.  Under the 
proposed approach, managers would be required to disclose the exact details of 
their firm’s repurchase orders  before they are executed by brokers. Once an-
nounced, the orders could not be cancelled.   
  I show that pre-repurchase disclosure would reduce managers’ ability to profit 
from bargain repurchases.  Market participants would use disclosed repurchase 
orders to update their assessment of the stock’s actual value, taking into account 
the firm’s repurchase history, its financial condition, and managers’ contempora-
neous trading. To the extent the disclosure signals that the stock is likely to be un-
derpriced, market participants will bid up the price before the repurchase order is 
executed, reducing managers’ profits from each bargain repurchase.  Managers 
with a history of bargain repurchases will face substantial adjustments even when 
they buy back stock for other reasons, forcing them to “give back” over time part 
of their profits from previous bargain repurchases.  
  As bargain repurchases become less profitable, managers will conduct fewer 
such repurchases. And, as the number of bargain repurchases declines, it will be 
harder for managers to inflate the stock price by announcing repurchase programs 
they have no intention of carrying out.  Pre-repurchase disclosure can therefore  
9 
reduce the transfer of value from public shareholders to managers and increase 
aggregate shareholder value by improving corporate payout decisions.  
  Of course, not all buybacks are designed to enrich managers at public inves-
tors’ expense.  Many repurchases are likely undertaken for shareholder-serving 
reasons.  For example, managers may conduct a buyback to acquire stock for em-
ployee o ption programs, or to distribute cash tax-efficiently.  Importantly, pre-
repurchase disclosure does not hinder the use of repurchases for such shareholder-
benefiting purposes.  Nor  will it discourage managers from conducting share-
holder-serving repurchases. Pre-repurchase disclosure can therefore reduce the  
10 
costs associated with the opportunistic use of buybacks and misleading repurchase 
announcements without undermining repurchases’ potential benefits.13 
  Before proceeding, I would like to make explicit my normative framework.  I 
consider managers’ decisions to be “desirable” or “efficient” when they maximize 
what I call “aggregate shareholder value” — the present value of the cash flowing 
to the firm’s current and future shareholders over time.  Under this framework, an 
action that reduces the total amount of value available to shareholders is undesir-
able, even if it makes current shareholders better off.    
  It is also worth stating the assumptions about securities pricing underlying my 
analysis. When analyzing securities pricing, economists and legal academics have 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 This Article builds on my earlier work on open market repurchases.  See Fried, Open 
Market, supra note 5.  In that article, I systematically critique the “faithful signaling” 
explanation for repurchases advanced by some economists and sketch out the 
argument, which I develop more fully here, that managers use open market buybacks 
for informed trading and misleading repurchase announcements to boost the stock 
price before selling their shares.  Unlike this Article, however, Open Market does not 
estimate the value diverted to managers through bargain repurchases, identify and 
systematically analyze the payout distortions resulting from the use of buybacks for 
informed trading, or offer a proposal designed to reduce managers’ ability to engage in 
bargain repurchases and inflated-price sales.  In a contemporaneously written article, Bill 
Bratton also expresses a skeptical view about the desirability of open market repurchases.  See 
William W. Bratton, The New Dividend Puzzle, 93 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2005). Bratton points 
out that repurchases, by reducing the number of outstanding shares, can be used to mask the 
cost of option compensation and distort reported earnings per share. In light of these 
potential problems, he urges boards to carefully consider whether, especially after the recent 
dividend tax cut, repurchases make shareholders better off.  However, Bratton does not 
systematically analyze the economic costs of bargain repurchases and false signaling  or 
propose a regulatory solution to reduce these costs, as I seek to do in this Article.  
  
11 
often assumed that the market price is the best possible estimate, based on public 
information, of a stock’s value. As a result, investors’ demand curve for the stock is 
essentially horizontal --  there is infinite demand for the stock at or below the mar-
ket price, and no demand above. 14 
  However, there is considerable evidence that investors hold different views 
about the value of publicly traded stock. In the presence of such heterogeneous be-
liefs, the demand curve for stock slopes downward.  The highest-valuing investor 
would be willing to hold the stock even if it were to trade at a price much higher 
than the current market price. At lower prices, more and more investors would be 
willing to own the shares.  If the demand curve for a given stock slopes downward, 
the stock will trade at a price reflecting the subjective valuation of the firm’s low-
est-valuing (or “marginal”) shareholder. 15 
    When the demand curve for stock slopes downward, managers can boost 
the stock price not only by announcing a repurchase program but also by repur-
chasing shares from low-valuing shareholders. Thus, managers wishing to unload 
their own shares at a higher price may have an incentive to use repurchases to ex-
ert upward pressure on the price.16  The  use of repurchases to exert price pressure 
would create payout distortions in addition to those I identify in this Article.  For 
example, managers seeking to boost the stock price before selling shares might re-
                                                                                                                                                             
14  See Fried, Insider Signaling, supra note 5, at 434. 
15  See Fried, Insider Signaling, supra note 5, at 434-35. 
16  Id., at 435-436.  
12 
purchase shares with funds that can generate more value invested in the firm even 
when the stock is overpriced.    
  Because I wish to focus here on managers’ use of repurchases for informed 
trading and false signaling -- forms of opportunism which can arise whether stock 
demand curves are horizontal or downward sloping -- will, generally assume, as is 
common in most of the literature, that the market price is the best possible esti-
mate, based on public information, of a stock’s value and that the demand curve is 
horizontal.   My aim is to show that, even under such market conditions, manag-
ers’ use of repurchases can transfer value from public shareholders and lead to 
payout distortions that reduce aggregate shareholder value.17  
  The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the impor-
tance of corporate payout policy and the growing use of open market repurchases 
to distribute cash. It then identifies and explains the potential advantages of these 
stock buybacks to shareholders and describes how they are currently regulated.  
  Part II shows that managers are currently able to misuse open market repur-
chases for informed trading thereby enriching themselves at the expense of public 
shareholders.  It begins by demonstrating that a repurchase has the same economic 
effects as a two-part transaction in which non-selling shareholders buy stock from 
sellers at the repurchase price, and the firm then issues a dividend. Thus, managers 
aware the stock is underpriced can use a repurchase to indirectly buy bargain-
                                                                                                                                                             
17 In future work, I plan to analyze the additional payout distortions that are likely to arise 
from managers’ use of repurchases in markets either where stock demand curves are 
downward sloping or investors are myopic.    
13 
price shares from selling shareholders. It then presents evidence that managers 
frequently conduct such bargain repurchases.  
  Part II also considers managers’ opportunistic use of repurchase announce-
ments.  It shows that the available data indicate that managers do not, as many 
economists have argued, use repurchase announcements to credibly signal that the 
stock is underpriced.  Rather, those data are consistent with managers using mis-
leading  repurchase announcements  to boost the stock price before selling their 
own shares.   Part II concludes by explaining how each form of opportunism -- 
bargain repurchases and false signaling -- facilitates the other.  
  Part III provides a tentative estimate of managers’ profits from bargain repur-
chases: approximately several billion dollars annually. It then explains how these 
profits come, directly or indirectly, at public investors’ expense.  
  In Part IV, I show that the cost to public investors of managers’ opportunistic 
use of stock buybacks is not limited to managers’ profits.  Bargain buybacks distort 
firms’ payout and decisions, reducing aggregate shareholder value and further 
diminishing public investors’ returns. Part IV also explains why bargain repur-
chases are unlikely to mitigate managers’ tendency to retain too much cash and 
why the effect of repurchases on public shareholders cannot accurately be gauged 
by the market’s reaction to repurchase announcements.  
  Part V  proposes the pre-repurchase disclosure approach to regulating buy-
backs.  It shows that pre-purchase disclosure would reduce managers’ bargain re-
purchase profits, their incentive to conduct bargain repurchases, and their ability 
to benefit from false signaling.  Pre-repurchase disclosure would thereby reduce 
the amount of value diverted from public shareholders to managers as well as im- 
14 
prove corporate payout policy, further increasing public shareholders’ returns.  
Part V also considers the potential costs of pre-repurchase disclosure and explains 
why they are likely to be minimal.  A brief conclusion follows. 
 
I.  Repurchases: Use, Benefits, and Regulation 
A.  Corporate Payout Policy and the Increasing Use of Repurchases  
 
  Publicly traded U.S. firms annually generate hundreds of billions of dollars in 
earnings.18 Each year, managers must decide how much of their firms’ retained 
earnings should be distributed to shareholders. In 2000, U.S. managers distributed 
over $350 billion to their own shareholders through dividends and repurchases.19  
  In a world of perfect capital markets, payout decisions might not be particu-
larly important. Corporations could obtain financing for any project with a posi-
tive net present value. Thus, a firm’s ability to invest in desirable projects would 
not depend on having cash on hand. If the firm required additional funding, it 
could simply tap the equity or debt markets for the necessary capital. Similarly, 
shareholders’ ability to invest in projects outside the firm would not depend on 
their personal cash holdings. They, too, could easily raise additional financing for 
any profitable venture. 
                                                                                                                                                             
18  See Grullon & Michaely, Dividends, supra note 1, at 1655.  
19  Id.  
15 
  However, capital markets are not perfect. Neither firms nor shareholders al-
ways can obtain outside financing for projects with positive net present value. As a 
result, payout decisions affect firms’ ability to fund existing and new projects as 
well as shareholders’ ability to invest in ventures outside of their firms. Payout de-
cisions also affect a firm’s debt/equity ratio (or “leverage”), which might influ-
ence firm value. Thus, payout policy can have substantial economic effects. 
  From an aggregate shareholder perspective, the optimal payout policy is one 
that maximizes the present value of the cash flowing to the firm’s current and fu-
ture shareholders over time. A firm should distribute one dollar to shareholders if 
and only if, on the margin,  investing  that dollar outside the firm would yield 
higher returns than investing it in the firm.  When the dollar would generate a re-
turn of 15% in the firm and 10% outside, the firm should retain the cash.  If, on the 
other hand, that dollar would generate a return of 5% in the firm and 10% outside, 
the firm should pay it out. 
  Managers must decide not only how much cash to distribute to shareholders 
but also the manner in which the cash should be paid out—through dividends,  
share repurchases, or both. Given the widespread use of both dividends and repur-
chases to distribute cash, it is unlikely that either form of payout is always better 
for shareholders. From an optimal payout perspective, managers should choose 
not only the payout amount that is best for shareholders but also the payout form 
that maximizes aggregate shareholder value.  
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  During the last several decades, many firms began using repurchases as their 
exclusive means of distributing cash.20 In addition, many traditionally dividend-
paying firms began also to repurchase shares.21 As a result, the use of share repur-
chases to distribute cash has increased substantially in both relative and absolute 
terms. While in 1980 there were only $13 of share repurchases for every $100 of 
dividends, by 2000 there were $113.22 During the 1980s and 1990s, the annual vol-
ume of share repurchases increased from $6.6 billion to almost $200 billion.23  
Most shares are repurchased by firms that also issue dividends.  
  Share repurchases can take the form of either an open market repurchase 
(OMR) or a repurchase tender offer (RTO). In an OMR, the firm buys its own stock 
on the market through a broker. In an RTO, the firm offers to buy back its own 
stock directly from shareholders, usually at a premium over the market price.24 
OMRs, the focus of this Article, are used to acquire 90% to 95% of the shares re-
purchased annually.25  
                                                                                                                                                             
20 See id. at 1662.  
21  Id. at 1659-1660; see also Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Disappearing Dividends: 
Changing Firm Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay?, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 19 (2001) 
(finding a lower propensity to pay dividends among public firms).  
22 Grullon & Michaely, Dividends, supra note 1, at 1655. 
23 Id.  
24 See Fried, Insider Signaling, supra note 5, at 428.  
25 Grullon & Ikenberry, supra note 3, at 33-34 (reporting that between 1980 and 1999, open-
market programs comprised about 92% of the total share repurchase announcements and 
91% of the total value of all repurchase announcements).    
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  As I describe in more detail below, firms announcing board authorization of an 
OMR program are not required to indicate the number or amount of shares they 
intend to repurchase.26 Nor are they obligated to repurchase a single share. Those 
firms announcing OMR programs and disclosing the amount of shares targeted 
have indicated they may acquire, on average, 7% of outstanding shares.27 Not all 
announcing  firms actually repurchase the targeted amount. Firms that actually 
buy back shares following OMR announcements tend to acquire shares over peri-
ods ranging from several months to several years.28 Companies announcing 
OMRs and disclosing the target usually buy back 70% to 80% of the targeted num-
ber of shares during the repurchase period.29  Until recently, firms were not re-
quired to disclose the number of shares actually repurchased – and generally did 
not volunteer this information.30 These figures are thus merely estimates. 
                                                                                                                                                             
26  See infra Part I.C.3 
27 See Ikenberry et al., Market Underreaction, supra note 6, at 185 (reporting that the average 
percentage of outstanding shares sought in all of the open market repurchases announced 
between January 1980 and December 1990 by firms listed on the American Stock Exchange 
(ASE), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ)  was 6.6%).  
28 See Stephens & Weisbach, supra note 6. In contrast, RTOs, which on average target twice 
as many shares as open market repurchases, are usually completed within one month. See 
Fried, Insider Signaling, supra note 5, at 428.  
29 See Stephens & Weisbach, supra note 6, at 314. Estimated program completion rates 
ranged from 53% to 72% for the period 1985-1996. See Jagannathan et al., Financial Flexibiltiy, 
supra note 6, at 357. 
30 Part I.C.3  infra discusses the current disclosure requirements for open market repurchases.  
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B.  Potential Benefits of Repurchases  
 
  Optimal payout policy requires managers to choose not only the amount of 
cash distributions that maximizes aggregate shareholder value but also the most 
beneficial form of payout: dividend or stock buyback. Many academic commenta-
tors have viewed the increased use of open market repurchases as desirable be-
cause they offer a number of possible advantages over dividends.31 This Section 
considers four potential benefits of repurchases: their ability to (1) pay out excess 
cash more tax-efficiently than dividends; (2) distribute transient cash flows more 
cost-effectively;  (3) provide shares needed for employee stock option plans; and 
(4) increase liquidity.  
  Before proceeding to describe each possible benefit, I wish to emphasize two 
points. First, I make no claim about the magnitude of any of these benefits. Second, 
even if these benefits make repurchases superior to dividends in certain cases, they 
are unlikely to make repurchases the most efficient form of payout in every case. 
Indeed, the continued widespread use of dividends—often by the same firms that 
                                                                                                                                                             
31  See Douglas O. Cook et al., On the Timing and Execution of Open Market Repurchases, 17 
REV. FIN. STUD. 463 (2004) (describing the liquidity-enhancing benefits of repurchases) 
[hereinafter Cook et al., On the Timing]; Grullon & Michaely, supra note 1, at 1650 (discussing 
the tax benefits of repurchases); See Jagannathan et al., Financial Flexibiltiy, supra note 6 
(detailing the use of open market repurchases to distribute transient cash flows);  Kahle, supra 
note 6 (considering the use of repurchases to acquire shares for employee stock option 
programs).   
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repurchase shares—suggests that dividends are often a more efficient form of pay-
out than repurchases.32  My purpose here is simply to describe the potential bene-
fits attributed by others to repurchases.  
 
  1. Tax-Favored Distribution of Excess Cash 
 
  From shareholders’ perspective, managers should distribute “excess cash”—
cash that can earn higher returns for shareholders outside the firm—in the most 
tax-efficient manner. Historically, repurchases have  been  a much more tax-
efficient means of distributing excess cash than dividends.33 The tax advantages 
of repurchases have diminished, however, because of the 2003 dividend tax cuts. 
Indeed, as I explain below, in certain situations dividends may now be more tax-
efficient.  
  Unless a shareholder is exempt from tax, she generally pays tax when she re-
ceives a dividend or sells her shares for a profit. Historically, profits on long term 
capital gains have been taxed far less heavily than dividends. Before the 2003 divi-
dend tax cut, for example, dividend income was treated as ordinary income, po-
tentially subject to the highest marginal federal tax rate of 35%. In contrast, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
32  In Part IV, I explain that managers’ ability to use buybacks for informed trading may 
cause them to use repurchases even when dividends would better serve shareholders, thereby 
reducing aggregate shareholder value.  
33 See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 13, at 12.   
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highest marginal federal rate for long-term capital gains was 20%.34 However, the 
2003 tax cuts lowered the highest marginal rate on both qualifying dividends and 
long-term capital gains to 15%.35  In fact, qualifying dividends are now taxed less 
heavily than short-term gains, which continue to be taxed at ordinary income 
rates. 
  In some cases, however, repurchases may still be at least slightly more tax-
efficient for shareholders than dividends. First, repurchases tend to shift the tax 
burden to shareholders with lower marginal rates. When a firm issues a dividend, 
all taxable shareholders are taxed on their pro rata share of the dividend. In con-
trast, when the firm repurchases shares, only those shareholders who choose to sell 
their shares are taxed. To the extent higher-bracket shareholders avoid selling their 
shares, leaving the selling to lower-bracket (or tax-exempt) shareholders, the ag-
gregate tax burden on shareholders is reduced.36    
  Second, repurchases allow tax-free recovery of “basis.” A shareholder receiv-
ing a dividend is taxed on the entire amount. By contrast, a selling shareholder is 
not taxed on the full amount of the sale proceeds but only on the capital gains (the 
                                                                                                                                                             
34  Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 
(2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.)  
35 See I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1)(C), 1(h)(11), 55(b)(3)(c) (West Supp. 2004).  Certain dividends do not 
qualify for the 15% tax rate which lapses on January 1, 2009 unless it is extended. Id.  
36  In principle, the IRS could treat non-selling shareholders as constructively receiving a 
taxable “stock” dividend (even though they do not receive any shares) because their 
percentage interest in the company increases. See I.R.C. §§ 302(b)(2), 305(b). But, to my 
knowledge, the IRS has never taken such a position with respect to shareholders of public 
companies.  
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difference between the sale proceeds and the shareholder’s cost basis in the stock). 
For example, a shareholder who sells $100 worth of shares that were purchased for 
$60 pays tax on only $40. And if the shares’ basis exceeds the sale price—that is, 
the shareholder sells at a loss—the shareholder can use the loss to offset other capi-
tal gains and, to a limited extent, ordinary income. The tax-free recovery of basis, 
together with the bracket-shifting effect described earlier, can make repurchases 
more tax-efficient than dividends, even when the tax rates on dividend income 
and capital gains are the same. 
  Nevertheless, the potential tax efficiency of repurchases should not be over-
stated. Many institutional shareholders, such as state and corporate pension funds, 
are tax exempt. Individual investors often own stock (directly, in their own bro-
kerage accounts, or indirectly, through mutual funds) in tax-favored accounts that 
either exempt dividend and capital gains income from tax or subject both forms of 
income to the same tax rate.37  The substantial presence of tax-exempt and tax-
indifferent investors may well explain why managers do not appear to heavily 
weigh the shareholder-level tax implications of their payout policies.38  T hus, 
                                                                                                                                                             
37  For example, over 40 million individuals hold investments totaling almost $2 trillion 
dollars in 401(k) plans. See Sarah Holden & Jack VanDerhei, 401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, 
Account Balances, and Loan Activity in 2003, 10 PERSPECTIVE 1 (Aug. 2004), available at 
http://www.ici.org/stats/res/per10-02.pdf. 
38  Survey data suggest that, for a majority of CFOs, tax considerations do not dictate the 
choice between dividends and repurchases. See Alon Brav et al., Payout Policy in the 21st 
Century (June 14, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=571046.  
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while repurchases may still offer tax advantages over dividends in certain situa-
tions, the magnitude of these benefits is likely to be quite small.  
 
  2. Efficient Distribution of Transient Cash Flows   
 
  Apart from repurchases’ possible tax benefits, buybacks may provide a more 
efficient method of distributing transient (non-recurring) excess cash flows -- es-
pecially relatively small amounts.  Managers seeking to distribute transient cash 
flows would not wish to initiate regular dividends or increase the firm’s current 
dividend.  Such steps might inadvertently signal a commitment by managers to 
continue paying dividends (or larger dividends) in the future.39   
  Managers could avoid sending such a commitment signal by either repurchas-
ing shares or by issuing a so-called “special” dividend.  By designating the divi-
dend as “special,” managers make clear that they do not intend to regularly pay 
such a dividend.  Special dividends were common in the past, but are less widely 
used today.40  
  However, a stock repurchase might involve lower transaction costs than a spe-
cial dividend -- especially for small payouts. When a firm distributes cash through 
                                                                                                                                                             
39  See, e.g., Jagannathan et al., Financial Flexibility, supra note 6, at 356 
40  See Harry DeAngelo et al., Special Dividends and the Evolution of Dividend Signaling 
313-17(Dec. 15, 1999) (unpublished manuscript),  available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=198448; see also Bratton, supra note 13, at 42-43.   
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a repurchase, both the firm and selling shareholders incur brokerage fees. If the 
trade is mediated through a market maker, the parties also bear the cost of the bid-
ask spread. The transaction costs of a repurchase thus increase with the amount 
repurchased.   In contrast, the transaction costs of a dividend are fixed.   When a 
firm issues a dividend, it must compute the dividend for each shareholder and 
mail out checks. These expenses are largely independent of the total amount dis-
tributed. The cost of mailing out a $10,000 dividend to shareholders is likely to be 
the same as the cost of mailing out a $10,000,000 dividend.   If the amount distrib-
uted is sufficiently large, a dividend is likely to involve lower per-dollar transac-
tion costs than a repurchase.  However, if the  payout is sufficiently small, a 
repurchase will be a more cost-effective method of distributing transient excess 
cash flows than a dividend.    
   
  3. Supplying Employee Stock Option Plans 
   
  Another advantage of repurchases over dividends is that they enable firms to 
provide shares for increasingly popular employee stock option programs. A large 
portion of executive compensation comes in the form of stock options.41 Options 
are also widely used to compensate and motivate lower-ranking employees. Under 
these plans, employees are given options to buy the firm’s stock at a certain strike 
price (usually equal to the grant-date market price). The options cannot be exer-
                                                                                                                                                             
41 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 137 (2004).  
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cised until the end of their vesting period. Upon exercise, the firm sells shares to 
the employee for the strike price, and the employee then typically sells those shares 
in the market.42 Employee stock option programs thus require a steady supply of 
shares. Repurchases can provide those shares; dividends cannot. 43   
  It is far from clear, however, that repurchases are always necessary to support 
shareholder-serving employee stock option programs. A board could simply print 
and issue new shares for its stock option program. Of course, the corporate charter 
might limit the number of shares the board is permitted to issue.  But in such a case 
the board could always seek shareholder approval to amend the charter and raise 
that limit to provide additional shares for employees. Shareholders would pre-
sumably approve such an increase if the employee stock option program served 
their interests. Nevertheless, if for some reason managers could not operate share-
holder-serving e mployee option plans without repurchasing shares, buybacks 
would provide this additional benefit.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
42 For a general overview of stock option compensation, see Kevin J. Murphy, Executive 
Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485, 2507-10 (Orley Ashenfelter & 
David Card eds., 1999). 
43 Indeed, there is some evidence of a connection between repurchases and the use of 
employee stock options. In particular, the number of shares repurchased by firms is correlated 
with the number of exercisable employee options. See Kahle, supra note 6, at 239. For an 
argument that repurchases can obscure the costs of option compensation, see Bratton, supra 
note 13, at 39.  
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  4. Liquidity Support  
 
  Some economists have argued that repurchases can benefit shareholders by 
improving liquidity, that is, reducing the costs incurred by shareholders in buying 
and selling shares.44  Investors often do not trade directly with each other. Rather, 
they trade with market makers,45 who continuously offer to buy certain securities 
at the “bid price” and to sell at the higher “ask price”.  The bid-ask spread com-
pensates the market maker for the various costs associated with market making 
and provides a profit. The lower the bid-ask spread, the cheaper it is for sharehold-
ers to trade the stock, and the more “liquid” the stock is said to be. 
  Repurchases might narrow the bid-ask spread and increase the stock’s liquid-
ity by reducing market makers’ costs. For example, market makers incur “inven-
tory costs,” the costs associated with holding shares for sale to buyers. The higher 
their inventory costs, the larger the bid-ask spread must be, everything else being 
equal. The increase in trading volume caused by a repurchase might make it easier 
for the  market maker to reverse a position in the stock, reducing  her holding 
costs—and thereby enabling her to narrow the bid-ask spread.46 In fact, there is 
                                                                                                                                                             
44 See, e.g., Cook et al., On the Timing, supra note 31. 
45  I use the term “market makers” to refer generally to all parties that intermediate between 
buyers and sellers. 
46 See Ajai Singh et al., Liquidity Changes Associated with Open Market Repurchases, 23 FIN. 
MGMT. 47, 50-51 (1994).    
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evidence that (non-bargain) repurchases can reduce the bid-ask spread.47  The 
lower bid-ask spread, in turn, increases shareholders’ net returns. Accordingly, an-
other advantage of repurchases over dividends is that they can, in certain situa-
tions, increase liquidity. 
   
C. Regulation 
 
  Having explained the possible advantages of repurchases over dividends, I 
now describe the three most important elements of the current regulatory frame-
work governing repurchases in the United States:48  (1) stock exchange and securi-
ties law disclosure requirements; (2) the anti-manipulation provisions of the 
securities laws, including the Rule 10b-18 safe harbor; and (3) the insider trading 
prohibition under Rule 10b-5. As we will see, these rules leave managers with con-
siderable opportunity to use bargain repurchases and misleading repurchase an-
nouncements to enrich themselves at the expense of public shareholders. 
                                                                                                                                                             
47See Cook et al., supra note 31, at 485-86 (finding, among a sample of firms, that bid-ask 
spreads narrowed when firms repurchased stock).  I discuss this study in more detail in Part 
III.B.2 infra. 
48 For a survey of regulations elsewhere, see Jaemin Kim et al., Survey on Open Market 
Repurchase Regulations: Cross Country Examination of the Ten Largest Stock Markets (Feb. 
1, 2004) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=496003.   
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  1. Disclosure Requirements 
  Firms conducting OMRs are subject to disclosure requirements imposed by 
stock exchanges and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  All major 
U.S. stock exchanges require a listed firm to announce the establishment by its 
board  of  an  open market buyback program.49  However, neither the stock e x-
changes nor the SEC requires an announcing firm to indicate the number (or dollar 
amount) of shares to be repurchased. Nor must a firm indicate the expiration date 
of its buyback program. As a result, many announcing firms fail to disclose either 
the targeted amount or the expiration date. Some firms disclose neither.50 Even if 
the firm does volunteer a repurchase target, it will make clear that the number of 
shares actually repurchased will depend on market conditions.51 Consequently, 
firms announcing repurchases are not obligated to buy back any stock. In fact, 
many do not repurchase a single share.52  
  For many years, neither the stock exchanges nor the SEC required firms to in-
dicate how many shares they had actually repurchased. However, in 2003 the SEC 
promulgated regulations requiring after-the-fact disclosure of firms’ buyback ac-
                                                                                                                                                             
49 See Matthew J. Gardella, Stock Buybacks: Legal Issues Under the Federal Securities Laws and 
Other Practical Considerations, 13 INSIGHTS 2 (1999).  
50 See Jagannathan et al., Financial Flexibility, supra note 6, at 358-60; Stephens & Weisbach, 
supra note 6, at 317.  
51  Cf. David L. Ikenberry & Theo Vermaelen, The Option to Repurchase Stock, 25 FIN. 
MGMNT. 9 (1996) (conceiving a repurchase announcement as the creation of an option to 
repurchase if the stock becomes underpriced). 
52 See Stephens & Weisbach, supra note 6, at 314.  
28 
tivities.  In their quarterly public filings, firms are now required to disclose, among 
other things, (1) the total number of shares repurchased during the previous quar-
ter; (2) the average price paid for those shares; (3) the number of shares that were 
purchased in the preceding quarter as part of a publicly announced plan; and (4) 
the maximum number of shares, or approximate dollar value, that may yet be re-
purchased under any share repurchase program.53   
  Importantly, the SEC’s disclosure requirements are retrospective. Investors 
may not learn about a firm’s repurchases until several months later.  As we will 
see in Part II, allowing managers to buy back shares secretly makes it easier for 
them to profit from bargain repurchases and misleading repurchase announce-
ments.   
    
2. Stock Manipulation Liability and the Rule 10b-18 Safe Harbor 
 
  Corporations, like individuals, are subject to the anti-manipulation provisions 
of Section 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.54 These provisions make 
                                                                                                                                                             
53 Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, Exchange Act Release 
Nos. 33-8335, 34-48766 (2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, 274) 
[hereinafter Purchases of Certain Equity], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8335.htm. Firms must also disclose the terms of any publicly announced share repurchase 
program, including (1) the date of announcement; (2) the specific share or dollar amount 
approved (if any); (3) the expiration date of the repurchase plan (if any); and (4) each share 
repurchase plan that has expired during the previous quarter, as well as those under which 
the firm does not intend to make any future purchases. Id.  
54 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2000).   
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it illegal to conduct a series of transactions creating actual or apparent active trad-
ing in a security to induce others to buy or sell the security.55 Purchases of a firm’s 
own shares could be considered manipulative if the intent of the repurchase is to 
drive up the stock price by making it appear that there is unusually heavy demand 
for the stock.  
  In 1982, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-18,56 which provides repurchasing firms a 
“safe harbor” from anti-manipulation liability when they repurchase their shares 
in accordance with the rule’s “manner, timing, price, and volume” conditions.57 
Among other things, Rule 10b-18 generally requires a firm seeking safe harbor to: 
(1) limit the number of shares it purchases on the open market each day to 25% of 
the average daily trading volume of the previous month;58 and (2) not offer a 
price that exceeds the highest independent bid or the last independent transaction 
price on the exchange (if any), whichever is higher.59 The rule went into effect in 
                                                                                                                                                             
55 Id. 
56 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18 (2004). 
 
57 Rule 10b-18 and Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-46980 (Dec. 10, 2002). The rule also provides that an issuer will 
not be liable under Rule 10b-5 solely by reason of the manner, timing, price, or volume of its 
repurchases if the issuer repurchases its common stock in accordance with the safe harbor. 
Purchases of Certain Equity, supra note 53.  
58  However, a firm may make a block-size purchase one day per week under Rule 10b-18 as 
long as it does not make any other purchases that day under Rule 10b-18, and as long as the 
block purchase is excluded from the calculation of average daily trading volume. 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-18(b)(4). 
59 Id. § 240.10b-18(b)(3).    
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1983 and appears to have made management more willing to engage in open mar-
ket repurchases: the volume of repurchases increased sharply shortly after the rule 
became effective.60  
  However, firms  are not required to abide by Rule 10b-18’s guidelines and 
many firms fail to comply with the requirements of the safe harbor.61 Not surpris-
ingly, firms engaging in open market repurchases have been able to accumulate 
shares relatively quickly. One study found that firms repurchase over half the tar-
geted shares within three to six months of the announcement date.62  Thus, Rule 
10b-18 has not prevented  managers from rapidly repurchasing shares that are 
temporarily underpriced. 
  3. Insider Trading Liability and Rule 10b-5  
 
  The third element of the regulatory framework governing stock buybacks is in-
sider trading law.  Corporations trading in their own shares are subject to Rule 
10b-5, the most important restriction on insider trading.63 Rule 10b-5 requires in-
siders—including the firm and its officers and directors—to refrain from trading 
                                                                                                                                                             
60 See Grullon & Michaely, The Information Content, supra note 4, at 659 (reporting that the 
amount of repurchases had tripled one year after Rule 10b-18 went into effect).  
61 See, e.g., Douglas O. Cook et al., An Analysis of SEC Guidelines for Executing Open Market 
Repurchases, 76 J. BUS. 289, 291 (2003). 
62  See Stephens & Weisbach, supra note 6, at 323. 
63 The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 under Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).  
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in the firm’s shares while in possession of “material” nonpublic information re-
garding their value.64 
  Rule 10b-5 appears to prohibit a firm from repurchasing shares when its man-
agers have private information indicating the stock is underpriced.  However, it 
cannot always prevent firms and their managers from trading profitably on non-
public information. The rule prohibits trading on inside information only when 
that information is legally “material.”65 Internal projections and other forms of 
“soft” information are not considered legally material even though they may be 
important and of great interest to investors.66 As a result, managers are free to 
conduct share repurchases without disclosing a wide range of valuable inside in-
formation.67 Moreover, courts have been reluctant to find even non-soft informa-
tion “material” unless  it concerns a “bombshell event,” such as  an imminent 
                                                                                                                                                             
64 See, e.g., McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he corporate 
issuer in possession of material nonpublic information … must, like other insiders in the same 
situation, disclose that information to its shareholders or refrain from trading with them.”); 
Fried, Reducing the Profitability, supra note 11, at 330.  
65 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643 (1997). 
66 See Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing is Coming to an End: The Case 
of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 682 (1999) (reporting that recent case law and 
the SEC’s position do not oblige companies to disclose forecasts).  
67 See Fried (1998), Reducing the Profitability, supra note 11, at 310; ROBERT CLARK, 
CORPORATE LAW 507-08 (1986) (noting that managers may have access to bits of information 
that are not important enough individually to be considered legally material but that in 
aggregate are very valuable); Donald Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and 
Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1335 (1999) (“Insiders at 
almost all times have the advantage of superior insight and a sense of which way things are 
going even if they do not possess a fact that a court would call material and nonpublic.”).  
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takeover offer whose announcement will dramatically change the stock price.68 
As we will see in Part II.A. 2, the high threshold for materiality permits insiders to 
trade indirectly through repurchases on important non-public information.69  
                                                                                                                                                             
68 See Fried, Reducing the Profitability, supra note 11, at 336. 
69 See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 
857, 886-87 (1983).   
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II. Informed Trading and False Signaling 
 
  Part I explained that repurchases may benefit shareholders by  more tax-
efficiently distributing excess cash, reducing transaction costs for small payouts, 
acquiring shares for employee stock option programs, and increasing liquidity. 
This Part shows that managers also are able to misuse repurchases for informed 
trading and false signaling.  Part II. A demonstrates that managers aware their 
firms’ stock is underpriced can, and do, use bargain repurchases to enrich them-
selves.   Part II. B describes how managers can use misleading repurchase an-
nouncements to boost the stock price before unloading their own shares.  It also 
explains how bargain repurchases and false signaling form a synergetic relation-
ship:  bargain repurchases facilitate false signaling, and vice versa.  
 
A. Informed Trading 
 
    Managers who are aware their stock is undervalued have the ability and in-
centive to use repurchases to indirectly buy stock for themselves at a low price.  
And there is a considerable amount of empirical evidence that managers conduct 
such bargain repurchases.     
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  1. Managers’ Ability and Incentive  
     
  Corporate managers have access to important private information relating to 
firm value by virtue of their positions within their firms. They use this information 
while trading personally in shares of their own firms. Managers increase their sell-
ing before releasing “bad news” and increase their buying before releasing “good 
news.”70  In addition, corporate insiders as a group consistently earn excess re-
turns in their personal trading.71  In earlier work, I estimated that managers have 
been making approximately $5 billion in extra profits each year trading on inside 
information.72   
   Managers may well be able to earn these insider trading profits without break-
ing the law.  As I explained earlier, the law prohibits trading on inside information 
only when that information is legally “material.”73  And certain types of informa-
tion are not considered legally material even though they would be of great inter-
                                                                                                                                                             
70  See Fried, Reducing the Profitability, supra note 11, at 317-20 (collecting and summarizing 
studies). For example, corporate insiders sell heavily in the five-month period preceding a 
bankruptcy announcement. See Thomas Gosnell et al., Bankruptcy and Insider Trading: 
Differences Between Exchange-Listed and OTC Firms, 47 J. FIN. 349, 350-53 (1992); Hasan Nejat 
Seyhun & Michael H. Bradley, Corporate Bankruptcy and Insider Trading, 70 J. BUS. 189 (1997). 
71  See Fried, Reducing the Profitability, supra note 11, at 321-23 (collecting and summarizing 
studies). One study found that in managers’ personal trading between 1984 and 1989, which 
presumably includes trades not based on inside information (for example, liquidity-driven 
sales), they annually earned excess returns averaging 7%. See H. Nejat Seyhun, The Effective-
ness of Insider Trading Sanctions, 35 J.L. & ECON. 149, 158-60 (1992).  
72  See Fried, Reducing the Profitability, supra note 11, at 323. 
73 See supra Part I.C.3.  
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est to investors. 74  As a result, managers are permitted to personally trade on a 
wide range of valuable inside information.  
  I will now explain how managers with such inside information can use 
share repurchases to indirectly buy stock at a bargain price. Diagram 1, below, 
helps show that a share repurchase has the same effects as the following three-step 
transaction (ignoring taxes and transaction costs): (1) non-selling shareholders di-
rectly purchase shares from sellers at the repurchase price; (2) the firm issues a 
dividend equal to the dollar amount of the repurchase; and (3) the firm effects a 
reverse stock 
split.
                                                                                                                                                             
74 See Fried, Reducing the Profitability, supra note 11, at 310;   
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Diagram 1:  Share Repurchase as Three-Step Transaction 
  Suppose that XYZ Corporation has five shares outstanding. Four are held by 
non-selling shareholders, collectively designated as “NS;” one is held by a seller,  
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designated as “S”. The figure to the left of the equality symbol (“=”) shows a stock 
repurchase in which XYZ repurchases S’s single share for $100. The effect of the 
repurchase is that S has exchanged his share for $100, XYZ has distributed $100 in 
cash, and NS owns four (100%) of XYZ’s four outstanding shares. 
  The figures to the right of the equality symbol show three transactions: (1) NS 
buys S’s share for $100, and now holds five shares; (2) XYZ distributes a dividend 
of $100 to NS; and (3) XYZ effectuates a reverse stock split, converting NS’s five 
existing shares into four new shares.  The results of these three transactions are 
identical to those of the repurchase on the left: S has exchanged his share for $100;  
XYZ has distributed $100 in cash, and NS owns four (100%)  of XYZ’s four shares.    
  Because the third step of the three-step transaction – the reverse stock split -- is 
merely a nominal change with no economic significance, we can ignore it and fo-
cus  only  on  the first two transactions: (1) the shareholder stock transaction, in 
which non-selling shareholders buy stock from the seller; and (2) the payout.  Thus, 
again ignoring taxes and transaction costs, the economic effects of a repurchase 
are the same as a two-step transaction in which nonselling shareholders buy stock 
directly from sellers at the repurchase price and the firm then issues a dividend to 
nonselling shareholders.  
  Consider the distributional effects of these two transactions. The second trans-
action—the dividend payout to remaining shareholders—has no distributional ef-
fect among shareholders because the seller no longer has an economic interest in 
the firm and the dividend affects all nonselling shareholders equally. However, the 
first transaction—the shareholder-level trading transaction—can redistribute 
value among shareholders.  If the purchase price is less than the stock’s actual  
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value, the shareholder-level trading transfers value from the seller to non-selling 
shareholders. Because the economic consequences of a repurchase are identical to 
the economic effects of this two-step transaction, it follows that repurchasing stock 
for a price below the stock’s actual value transfers value from sellers to nonselling 
shareholders.  In effect, nonselling shareholders buy shares from the sellers at a 
bargain price.  
  In general, the value transferred to nonselling shareholders equals the differ-
ence between the actual value of the stock and the repurchase price, multiplied by 
the number of shares repurchased. Nonselling shareholders benefit in the transfer 
pro rata. Thus, the more shares managers own, the more value they can capture 
from selling shareholders, and the greater is their incentive to conduct bargain re-
purchases.  
  In fact, managers of U.S. firms announcing repurchases tend to own a substan-
tial fraction of the firms’ shares before the repurchase—an average of 15% to 
20%.75  If managers own (and retain) 15-20% of a repurchasing firm’s shares, they 
would capture an average of one out of every five or six dollars of value trans-
ferred from sellers to non-selling shareholders. Accordingly, managers can benefit 
significantly from bargain repurchases.  
  To be sure, managers buying shares for their own account capture 100% of any 
insider trading profits. Thus, one might wonder why managers ever bother to use a 
repurchase to indirectly buy underpriced stock. Personal insider trading would 
                                                                                                                                                             
75 See William J. McNally, Open Market Stock Repurchase Signaling, 28 FIN. MGMNT. 55, 59 
(1999); Vafeas, supra note 6, at 112-13.   
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appear to be a more efficient way for managers to exploit private information in-
dicating that the stock is underpriced.    
  However, a number of factors may make it easier for managers to use repur-
chases to acquire underpriced stock than to buy the shares directly for their own 
accounts.  First, managers facing liquidity constraints might find it difficult to buy 
as many shares as they would like. Such managers might purchase as many shares 
as they can directly in the market, given their liquidity constraints, and then, after 
they have reached those limits, conduct a repurchase. In fact, managers frequently 
buy shares for their own accounts before announcing repurchases.76 
  Second, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits 
managers from making what are commonly referred to as “short-swing profits,” 
will prevent managers from directly buying shares in many circumstances.77 A 
corporate insider makes a short-swing profit if she buys and sells stock within a 
six-month period and the purchase price is lower than the sale price.78  Thus, a 
manager who e ither has sold shares at a higher price within the previous six 
months or expects to sell shares at a higher price within the next six months will 
face Section 16(b) liability if she buys stock directly in the market. In contrast, Sec-
tion 16(b) does not apply to indirect purchases through stock buybacks.   
                                                                                                                                                             
76 See Raad & Wu, supra note 6, at 57. 
77 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000). 
78 Id. The rule applies not only when the purchase precedes the sale, but also when the sale 
precedes the purchase. Id.  
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  Third, many firms impose “trading-windows” and “blackout” periods, which 
limit managers’ trading to certain prescribed periods throughout the year.79 These 
restrictions may prohibit some managers from buying stock at a time when they 
believe that the stock is underpriced. During these no-trade periods, the managers 
can use the firm to indirectly buy low-price shares they could not purchase di-
rectly.  
  Of course, managers do not have unlimited ability to use repurchases for in-
formed trading. Managers do not always have private information indicating that 
the firm’s stock is significantly underpriced.  Even if managers know the stock is a 
bargain, the firm may lack sufficient cash to buy back stock.80  Managers might 
also be reluctant to repurchase shares when their private information is clearly 
“material” under the insider trading laws. Nevertheless, these constraints do not 
appear to prevent managers from frequently engaging in bargain repurchases, as 
the evidence  below makes clear.  
 
  2. Evidence  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
79 See J. Carr Bettis et al., Corporate Policies Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 191 
(2000).  
80 Managers of an underpriced firm might be able to raise funds by issuing debt, but there is 
likely to be a time lag, during which the stock might become fairly priced (or even 
overpriced). In addition, the costs to managers of issuing additional debt, such as the pressure 
to make interest and principal payments, might exceed the expected benefit to them of a 
bargain repurchase.   
41 
  Having shown that managers have the ability and incentive to conduct bar-
gain repurchases,   I now turn to the considerable empirical evidence indicating 
that managers often use repurchases to indirectly buy stock at a low price. The 
evidence can be divided into two categories: (1) managers’ behavior and state-
ments; and (2) stock price movements around and following repurchase program 
announcements. 
 
    a. Manager Behavior 
   
  Managers’ behavior and statements before, during, and after buyback program 
announcements are consistent with the use of repurchases for informed trading. 
To begin, the relationship between managers’ equity stakes and their incentive to 
conduct bargain repurchases suggests that managers with larger ownership inter-
ests are not only more likely to conduct repurchases but also more likely to conduct 
them when stock is underpriced. A stock is likely to have been underpriced if, after 
the repurchase, its price experiences positive abnormal (i.e., market-adjusted) re-
turns. Thus, one would expect a positive correlation between managerial owner-
ship and post-repurchase stock returns.  Indeed, there is a positive relationship 
between pre-repurchase managerial percentage ownership and post-repurchase 
stock appreciation.81   
                                                                                                                                                             
81 See Raad & Wu, supra note 6, at 57 (1995) (finding that abnormal returns following 
repurchases are positively correlated with pre-buyback management ownership).   
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  Managers’ behavior after repurchase announcements is also consistent with 
the use of repurchases for informed trading. In particular, managers are more 
likely to follow up a repurchase program announcement with actual repurchases if 
the stock subsequently performs poorly.82 Focusing on “value firms” (firms with a 
high book-to-market ratio) that had announced repurchases, one study found that 
among the firms in which managers subsequently repurchased shares, four-year 
post-announcement abnormal returns were 25%, compared to 0% for firms that 
did not subsequently repurchase any shares.83   A recent study of repurchases on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, also concluded that managers were using inside 
information to make repurchase decisions.84 
  Survey data from the last several decades further support the conclusion that 
managers frequently use repurchases to buy stock they know is underpriced. Ac-
cording to the authors of a major 2004 survey of financial executives regarding 
their firms’ payout policies, “the most popular response for all repurchase ques-
tions on the entire survey is that firms repurchase when their stock is a good value, 
relative to its true value: 86.4% of all firms agree or strongly agree with this suppo-
sition.”85 The study reported that 50% of CFOs “say that their firm tracks repur-
                                                                                                                                                             
82 See Stephens & Weisbach, supra note 6. 
83 See Konan Chan et al., Do Managers Trade Consistently? Evidence Linking Insider 
Trading to Actual Share Repurchase Activity 2-3 (Sept. 2003) (working paper) (on file with 
California Law Review). 
84 See Paul Brockman & Dennis Y. Chung, Managerial Timing and Corporate Liquidity: 
Evidence from Actual Share Repurchases, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 417, 418 (2001). 
85 Brav et al., supra note 38, at 17-18.   
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chase timing and that their firm can beat the market.”86 According to the survey’s 
organizers, “executives tell us that they accelerate (or initiate) share repurchases 
when their stock price is low.”87 Earlier studies yielded similar responses. When 
asked in an anonymous 1988 survey what was the most important circumstance 
precipitating a repurchase, 66% of the surveyed managers responded “low stock 
price,” six times as many as the next most popular answer, “need for treasury 
stock.”88  The correlation between managerial ownership and post-repurchase 
stock price appreciation, managers’ post-announcement buyback decisions, and 
managers’ own statements about their motives in repurchasing stock all point to 
the frequent use of repurchases to buy stock at a bargain price.  
 
    b. Stock Price Behavior 
 
  Stock price behavior during and after repurchase announcements also suggest 
that inside information drives many repurchases. Consider first stock price move-
ments around the time of repurchase announcements.  If managers often use re-
purchases to buy stock at a low price, a repurchase announcement will tend to 
signal that the expected value of the stock is higher than the current market 
                                                                                                                                                             
86 Id. at 18.  
87 Id. at 17. 
88 George P. Tsetsekos et al., A Survey of Stock Repurchase Motivations and Practices of Major 
U.S. Corporations, 7 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 15, 17-18, tbl.2 (1991).     
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price.89  Indeed, when a repurchase is announced, the market reacts to the an-
nouncement by bidding up the price of the stock. Repurchase announcements are 
associated with short-term abnormal price increases averaging 3% to 4% in the 
1980s90 and 1% to 2% in the 1990s.91 
   Moreover, stock price movements are more extreme around announcements 
that likely reflect information-based trading. Firms that repurchase shares consis-
tently—and are therefore likely to be buying shares for ongoing employee stock op-
tion programs rather than engaging in informed trading—experience much lower 
announcement returns than firms that announce a repurchase for the first time or 
are infrequent repurchasers.92 Infrequent repurchase announcers—those  more 
                                                                                                                                                             
89 See, e.g., Ikenberry et. al., Market Underreaction, supra note 6 at 190. A stock’s value 
depends on the expected value of its future cash flows, which in turn is a function of the 
amount and timing of those cash flows as well as the interest rate appropriate for discounting 
the cash flows. The higher the volatility, the higher the discount rate. Thus, managers can 
reap profits by trading based on private information about the amount, timing, or volatility of 
future cash flows. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that repurchasing firms have much 
lower future volatility than the market had assumed. See Grullon & Michaely, The Information 
Content, supra note 4, at 678.   
90 See Ikenberry et al., Market Underreaction, supra note 6, at 190 (reporting that the average 
market reaction to OMR announcements for all of the OMRs announced between January 
1980 and December 1990 by firms listed on the ASE, NYSE, and NASDAQ was 3.54%).  
91 See Kahle, supra note 6, at 245-46 (finding that between 1991 and 1996 the average 
abnormal return around the announcement of open market repurchases by firms in the 
Execucomp database was 1.6%).  
92 See Jagannathan & Stephens, supra note 6, at 71-72.  
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likely to be engaged in bargain repurchasing—also tend to have higher levels of 
managerial ownership.93  
  Consider also post-announcement returns. If managers use repurchases to buy 
stock at a low price, the stock prices of firms announcing repurchases should, on 
average, outperform those of firms not announcing repurchases in the post-
announcement period. Indeed, stock prices of repurchasing firms increase faster 
than stock prices of similar firms not conducting repurchases. A recent study 
found that shares of firms announcing repurchases earn abnormal returns of 6.7% 
in the first year following the announcement and 23.6% over the subsequent four 
years.94 These post-repurchase returns strongly suggest that, as a group, firms an-
nouncing OMRs are underpriced at the time repurchase programs  are a n-
nounced.95  
  To be sure, each of these stock price patterns could have an explanation other 
than the use of repurchases for informed trading.  Consider, for example, the mar-
                                                                                                                                                             
93  Id.  
94 See Konan Chan et al., Economic Sources of Gains in Stock Repurchases, 39 J. FIN. 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 461 (2004); see also Chan et al., supra note 83, at 2 (examining 
5,508 repurchase announcements between 1980 and 1996 and finding abnormal stock price 
performance of 5% the first year and 22% over four years among firms repurchasing shares, 
and a four-year abnormal return of 25% among value firms.).  
95 The fact that managers have inside information they can use in repurchasing shares does 
not mean that every repurchase will, ex post, turn out to transfer value from sellers to non-
selling shareholders. Managers with firm-specific inside information suggesting that the stock 
is underpriced may buy stock shortly before an unexpected large interest rate increase,  
slowdown in the economy, or adverse change in the firm’s industry that cause the stock price  
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ket’s positive reaction to repurchase announcements.  While it is consistent with 
the stock of repurchasing firms being, on average, underpriced, it is also consistent 
with traders learning that managers may distribute the firm’s excess cash rather 
than continue to hoard it .  However, the overall pattern of stock price movements 
around repurchases, along with managers’ behavior and their own accounts of 
why they repurchase shares, collectively provide extremely strong evidence that 
managers often use repurchases to indirectly buy underpriced stock. 
  Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the stock market’s positive reaction 
to a repurchase program announcement will – when the stock is underpriced -- 
narrow the gap between the share price and its actual value. The price increase fol-
lowing the announcement, in turn, will reduce managers’ profits from bargain re-
purchases.  
  However, when the stock is underpriced, the stock price increase following a 
repurchase announcement is unlikely to close, or even substantially reduce, the 
underpricing gap.  The market understands that boards may authorize a buyback 
even when the stock is not underpriced.  For example, the board might approve a 
repurchase so that managers can acquire shares for an employee stock option pro-
gram.  Moreover, as we will shortly see, managers might announce a repurchase 
program they have no plan to conduct simply to boost the stock price, perhaps to 
unload  their own shares at a higher price.  Thus, a repurchase announcement does 
not clearly signal that the stock is underpriced.  The likelier it is that a repurchase 
                                                                                                                                                             
to fall. However, managers repurchasing on inside information can realistically expect to 
transfer value from sellers  and, on average, are likely to do so.  
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announcement does not reflect underpricing, the more muted the market’s re-
sponse to such an announcement will be, and the more repurchasing managers can 
profit when the stock is in fact underpriced.  
 
B. False Signaling    
 
  Managers can enrich themselves not only through bargain repurchases but 
also by “false signaling”  -- making  misleading repurchase authorization a n-
nouncements to inflate the stock price before selling their own shares.   I will now 
describe false signaling in greater detail, and show that it forms a synergetic rela-
tionship with bargain repurchases.  Before doing so, however, I briefly present and 
critique the standard signaling explanation for open market repurchases found in 
the economics literature, which I call “faithful signaling.”   
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  1. The Faithful Signaling Story 
   
  A number of economists have argued that managers use open market repur-
chases to credibly signal that their firm’s stock is underpriced.96 Specifically, man-
agers who have private information indicating that the stock is underpriced and 
who wish to send a credible signal to that effect can do so by committing to repur-
chase stock while not selling their own shares.97  
  As we saw, a repurchase is distributionally equivalent to non-selling share-
holders buying sellers’ shares.  Thus, when managers make such a double com-
mitment—first, to have the firm repurchase shares, and second, not to sell their 
own shares until the underlying good news emerges—they effectively commit to 
indirectly buy their pro-rata share of the acquired shares at the repurchase price. If 
the stock is actually worth less than the repurchase price, the repurchase makes 
managers worse off by causing them to indirectly buy shares at an inflated price. 
Thus, by committing to repurchase stock and not to sell their own shares, manag-
ers can send a credible signal that share value exceeds the repurchase price.98   
  While it is theoretically possible to use repurchases for such faithful signaling, 
there is little evidence managers actually do so.99 When announcing repurchase 
                                                                                                                                                             
96 See, McNally, supra note 75, at 56. 
97 See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 6, at 539. 
98 See id.   
99  See Fried, Open Market, supra note 5, at 879-881; see also Ok-Rial Song, Hidden Social Costs 
of Open Market Share Repurchases, 27 IOWA J. CORP. L. 425 (2002).  For an explanation why  
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programs, managers do not commit to purchase a minimum number of shares.100  
In fact, about 25% of announcing firms do not buy back a single share.101 More-
over, managers do not promise to retain their own shares. Nor is there an implicit 
commitment by managers to do so.  Indeed, m anagers frequently sell shares 
around repurchase announcements. The selling is so heavy that both mean and 
median managerial ownership (as a percentage of outstanding shares) fall around 
the time of repurchase announcements.102  Thus, even if there were a commit-
ment on the part of the firm to buy back shares, the repurchase announcement 
would still not credibly signal underpricing.  However, as I will shortly explain, 
managers’ selling behavior following repurchase program announcements is com-
pletely consistent with false signaling. 
 
  2.  False Signaling with Misleading Repurchase Announcements 
  Managers wishing to sell their own shares at a higher price may have an incen-
tive to announce a share repurchase they do not intend to conduct to boost the 
stock price.  And there is evidence consistent with such false signaling. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the same credible signal can be sent without an OMR, and why it is against managers’ self-
interest to engage in faithful signaling with or without an OMR, see Fried, Open Market, supra 
note 5, at 875-79. 
100  See David L. Ikenberry & Theo Vermaelen, The Option to Repurchase Stock, 25 FIN. MGMT. 
9, 10 (1996). 
101  See Utpal Bhattacharya & Amy K. Dittmar, Costless Versus Costly Signaling in Capital 
Markets: Theory and Evidence 4 (Oct. 2001) (working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=250049. 
102  See Vafeas, supra note 6.   
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    a. Managers’ Incentive and Ability 
   
  We have seen that repurchase program announcements are generally greeted 
favorably by the market. 103   Market participants know that many repurchases 
are information-driven. Thus, an announcement signals that the stock might be 
undervalued, causing investors to bid up the price.104  
  Managers can exploit the market’s predictable reaction to repurchase an-
nouncements by announcing the authorization of buyback programs they have no 
intention of conducting, and  then unloading their shares at the higher post-
announcement price. Most managers receive a substantial portion of their com-
pensation in the form of stock options that give them the right to purchase the 
corporation’s shares at a discounted price.105 After the options vest, managers ex-
ercise them and sell most or all of the underlying stock.106 Managers sell for many 
different reasons. Some wish to diversify or gain liquidity. Others may be aware of 
                                                                                                                                                             
103  See supra Part II.A.2.b. 
104  There are, of course, other reasons why market participants might react favorably to a 
repurchase program announcement besides the signal it sends about the stock’s actual value. 
For example, investors might bid the price up because they believe the firm will now 
distribute excess cash that it had been inefficiently hoarding.  For our purposes, what is 
important is that at least part of the stock price reaction reflects the possiblity of underpricing.    
105  See Murphy, supra note 42, at 2507-10. 
106  See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 41, at 176 (2004).   
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“bad news” that is likely to cause the stock price to drop.107 Whatever the motiva-
tion, however, managers intending to sell shares wish to dispose of them at the 
highest possible price.  Given the effect of repurchase announcements on stock 
prices, managers may sometimes have  an  incentive to announce a repurchase 
solely to boost the price of the stock before selling their shares, even if they have no 
immediate intention of repurchasing any shares. 
  By announcing a repurchase program even when they have no intention of re-
purchasing stock, managers about to sell their own shares essentially attempt to 
“mimic” managers of underpriced firms that use repurchases to buy stock at a low 
price. This mimicking appears to be successful: there is no difference in market re-
action between announcements followed by repurchase activity and announce-
ments not followed by actual buybacks 108 
  To the extent that managers use misleading repurchase announcements to sell 
their shares for more than their actual value, they transfer value from the parties 
buying their shares—either public investors or market makers. The amount trans-
ferred is simply the difference between the sale price and the stock’s actual value, 
multiplied by the number of shares sold.  
                                                                                                                                                             
107 For an explanation of the limited effect that insider trading laws have on managers’ 
ability to trade on inside information, see supra Part I.C.3. For a summary of empirical studies 
finding that managers sell before the release of bad news, see Fried, Reducing the Profitability, 
supra note 11, at 317-20. 
108 See Bhattacharya & Dittmar, supra note 101, at 27.   
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  To be sure, average stock price reactions to repurchase announcements are 
fairly modest: only several percent. 109 But these figures are averages; in some 
cases, an announcement might be expected to boost the stock price substantially. 
Moreover, for managers who are either selling millions of dollars of stock or exer-
cising expiring options with strike prices near the pre-announcement market price, 
the ability to sell shares for even a slightly higher price may be important. As we 
will now see  the  evidence is consistent with managers’ use of repurchase an-
nouncements to boost the stock price for this purpose. 
                                                                                                                                                             
109 See Kahle, supra note 6, at 245-46 (finding that between 1991 and 1996 the average 
abnormal return around the announcement of open market repurchases by firms in the 
Execucomp database was 1.6%).   
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    b. Evidence  
 
  The empirical evidence that discredits the faithful signaling story is consistent 
with managers announcing repurchase programs they have no intention of execut-
ing simply to increase the stock price before selling their own shares.  False signal-
ing would predict that many firms announcing repurchase programs do not 
repurchase many (or any) shares.  In fact, 25% of announcing firms do not repur-
chase a single share.110  If firms announced share repurchase authorizations only 
to conduct low-price repurchases or to use repurchases for one of the shareholder-
serving reasons described in Part I.B, one would expect most buyback program an-
nouncements to be followed by at least some repurchases. The fact that a substan-
tial fraction of  announcing  firms  do  not buy back stock  suggests that  these 
repurchase  program  announcements  may  serve another purpose: to boost the 
stock price. 111  
                                                                                                                                                             
110  See Utpal Bhattacharya & Amy K. Dittmar, Costless Versus Costly Signaling in Capital 
Markets: Theory and Evidence 4 (Oct. 2001) (working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=250049. 
111 Directors might also authorize the managers to buy back shares when the stock is not 
underpriced so that -- should the stock become underpriced in the future – managers can 
quietly conduct bargain repurchases without first making any public announcement..See 
generally Ikenberry & Vermaelen, supra note 51.  Such option-creating announcements will 
not be followed by an actual repurchase unless managers subsequently learn that the stock is 
underpriced and have cash available to buy back stock.  It is possible, then, that at least some 
of repurchase program announcements not followed by actual buybacks have a purpose 
other than price-boosting.  However, unlike false signaling, the option explanation for such 
announcements cannot account for a variety of findings I now turn to discuss, including the 
finding that there is heavy managerial selling around repurchase program announcements.  
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  False signaling would also predict that, around misleading repurchase pro-
gram announcements, there is large-scale selling by managers. In fact, there is con-
siderable selling activity around repurchase program announcements generally.  
One study found that the selling is heavy enough to cause both mean and median 
managerial ownership to decline.112  The study does not distinguish between an-
nouncing firms that subsequently repurchased shares and announcing firms that 
did not. Thus, its findings do not directly indicate whether, as the false signaling 
explanation would predict, the observed post-announcement managerial selling is 
heavily concentrated in announcing firms that do subsequently buy back stock.   
  However, other findings suggest that there is likely to be a strong negative cor-
relation between post-announcement selling and subsequent buyback activity.  
Managers generally earn abnormal positive returns trading in their own firms’ 
stock – that is, they tend to buy when the stock is underpriced and sell when it is 
overpriced. 113  And, as we have seen, managers are more likely to repurchase 
shares  after a repurchase announcement if the stock is underpriced. 114   One 
would therefore not expect post-announcement managerial selling to be randomly 
distributed among repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms. Instead, these stud-
ies predict that post-announcement selling is likely to be disproportionately heavy 
                                                                                                                                                             
112  See Vafeas, supra note 6.  
113  See Fried, Reducing the Profitability, supra note 11, at 317-20 (collecting and summarizing 
studies).  
114 See, e.g., Konan Chan et al., supra note 83, at 2-3.  
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in firms that subsequently do not repurchase shares, which is consistent with the 
use of buyback announcements for false signaling.     
  False signaling also predicts that the stock of some firms announcing repur-
chase programs is likely to be overpriced; managers simply wish to boost the stock 
price  further before unloading their shares. It also suggests that false-signaling 
managers may simultaneously take other steps to inflate the stock price. In fact, a 
recent study finds that managers who announce that they are repurchasing stock 
because the stock is underpriced, and who thus may be attempting to boost the 
stock price, tend to manipulate earnings upward around the time of the an-
nouncement.115 Although the market reacts positively to these announcements, 
with average abnormal returns of almost 3% around the announcement date, these 
stocks experience large negative abnormal returns over subsequent months, sug-
gesting that the firms might have been overpriced at the time of the repurchase 
announcements.116  
  Finally, managers themselves admit that they sometimes announce repurchase 
programs simply to boost the stock price. Following the 1987 stock market crash, 
for example, many firms announced repurchase programs to show confidence in 
their stock and bolster stock prices.117 However, the number of outstanding 
                                                                                                                                                             
115  See De-Wai Chou & Jane-Raung Philip Lin, False Signals from Open Market Stock 
Repurchase Announcements: Evidence from Earnings Management and Analysts’ Forecast 
Revisions 3 (Nov. 20, 2003) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=471122. 
116 See id. at 6. 
117  Jay Palmer, Promises, Promises: Or What Happened to All Those Post-Crash Buybacks?, 13 
BARRON’S 21, 21 (1988).   
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shares declined for only 41% of the NYSE and AMEX firms announcing repur-
chases and for only 33% of the OTC firms announcing repurchases.118 After Ar-
kansas Best announced an intention to repurchase two million shares, one 
manager was later quoted in The New York Times as saying, “I don’t think we ever 
intended to repurchase two million shares. We did it to build confidence.”119 Ac-
cording to a vice president at Standard & Poor’s, a credit rating agency, “A prob-
lem with repurchase announcements is that companies have informed S&P that 
they have little intention of implementing the authorizations. In fact, many firms 
made big repurchase announcements after the crash, and then ran over to S&P in 
an effort to protect their credit rating.”120 Thus, by managers’ own accounts, they 
announce repurchases without any intent to buy back stock, solely to boost the 
stock price.  
  Given the available data, it is difficult to know how many repurchase an-
nouncements are made opportunistically to boost the stock price before managers 
sell their shares. Nevertheless, the data on post-announcement repurchase activity 
and managerial selling, along with managers’ own accounts, are all consistent 
with managers using repurchase announcements to boost stock prices, which in 
turn enables them to sell their shares at a higher price.  I will now explain how 
                                                                                                                                                             
118 Beverly Kracher & Robert R. Johnson, Repurchase Announcements, Lies and False Signals, 16 
J. BUS. ETHICS 1677, 1678 (1997). 
119 Palmer, supra note 117, at 21. 
120 I. Picker, Are Those Buyback Programs For Real?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 1988, at 
151.   
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false signaling can provide another, indirect benefit to managers: increasing their 
profits from bargain repurchases.  
 
  3. Bargain Repurchases and False Signaling: The Synergy 
  
  Although both bargain repurchases and false signaling arise from public firms’ 
use of buybacks to distribute cash, the two forms of opportunism are in some ways 
quite different.  One involves buying stock at a low price; the other, selling at a 
high price.  However, it turns out that these differences give rise to a useful syn-
ergy.  The more bargain repurchases managers conduct, the easier it is form them 
to profit from false signaling.  And the more false signaling there is, the larger 
managers’ bargain repurchase profits can be.     
   It is perhaps easiest to see that the widespread use of information-driven buy-
backs facilitates managers’ use of misleading repurchase program announcements 
to boost stock prices. Consider a world in which managers can engage in false sig-
naling but not bargain repurchases. In such a world, a repurchase announcement 
would not signal underpricing; the stock price would therefore increase little, if at 
all, in response to such announcement.  And managers would find it difficult to 
sell their own shares at an inflated price.  However, if managers can engage in 
bargain repurchases as well as false signaling, a repurchase program announce-
ment now indicates that the stock may be underpriced, boosting the stock price 
more, and making it easier for managers to profit from inflated-price sales.    
  Similarly, the use of misleading repurchase announcements makes it easier for 
managers to profit from information-based repurchases.  Consider a world in  
58 
which managers can engage in bargain repurchases but not false signaling. In such 
a world, a repurchase announcement would send a stronger signal of underpric-
ing. Investors would bid the stock price higher, reducing managers’ profits from 
their bargain repurchases.  But if managers can engage in false signaling as well as 
bargain repurchases, it is less likely that a particular announcing firm’s stock is ac-
tually underpriced. As a result, the reaction to repurchase program announce-
ments will be more muted, and it will be easier for managers of underpriced firms 
to announce repurchase programs and then buy shares at a low price.  
  Bargain repurchases and false signaling are synergetic because the presence of 
both forms of opportunism, rather than only one, reduces the information content 
of a repurchase program announcement.  This, in turn, increases the gap between 
the post-announcement stock price and its actual value strengthening managers’ 
ability to profit from both bargain repurchases and inflated-price sales.   Because 
an announcement could mean either that the stock is underpriced or that manag-
ers are seeking to boost the price before unloading their shares, the market will bid 
the price up somewhat (more than it would in a world without bargain repur-
chases),  but not that much (not as much as it would in a world without false sig-
naling).  Thus, whether the  stock is initially underpriced, correctly priced, or 
overpriced, the post-announcement stock price is likely to deviate from the stock’s 
actual value.  This increases managers’ ability to profit either from a bargain re-
purchase or by selling their shares at an inflated price.  We now turn to consider 
the potential magnitude of these profits, and at whose expense they are made. 
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III. Managers’ Profits, Public Investors’ Losses  
 
  We have seen  that managers opportunistically use low-price buybacks and 
misleading  repurchase program announcements to enrich themselves at others’ 
expense.  This Part begins by estimating the potential magnitude of managers’ 
profits from bargain repurchases: as much as several billion dollars annually.121 It 
then explains that the diversion of value  through bargain repurchases and in-
flated-price sales directly and indirectly reduces public investors’ returns. As a re-
sult, public shareholders earn less, on average, than they would in a world where 
managers do not use repurchases for informed trading and false signaling.     
  Throughout this Part, I assume for simplicity that managers’ opportunistic use 
of repurchases does not affect aggregate shareholder value —the present value of 
cash flowing to the firm’s shareholders over time. In other words, I assume that 
managerial value diversion is zero-sum: the cost it imposes on other market par-
ticipants is limited to managers’ gains. In the next Part, I will explain how manag-
ers’ opportunistic use of repurchases is likely to  distort payout decisions and 
thereby actually reduce aggregate shareholder value, further diminishing public 
shareholders’ returns.     
                                                                                                                                                             
121  There are not enough data available to construct even a rough estimate of managers’ 
profits from inflated-price sales following misleading repurchase program announcements.  
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A. Bargain Repurchase Profits 
 
  When managers use repurchases to buy stock at a bargain price, they enrich 
themselves at the expense of other market participants. As Part III. B will explain, 
the costs of managerial value diversion are ultimately borne by the firm’s public 
investors. For now, however, I will set aside the issue of incidence to focus on the 
magnitude of managers’ profits from bargain repurchases, which the analysis be-
low suggests may be quite large.  
  Calculating the amount diverted by managers through a bargain repurchase is, 
at least conceptually, straightforward. First, one calculates the dollar volume of 
shares that managers indirectly acquire through the repurchase.  Second, one de-
termines the  amount of underpricing  – the  difference between the repurchase 
price(s) and the stock’s actual value. Third, one multiplies the volume of manag-
ers’ indirect purchases by the amount of underpricing. 
  In practice, however, calculating managers’ bargain repurchase profits is far 
from easy. Historically, firms were not required to report --  and did not voluntar-
ily disclose -- how many shares they had repurchased or the prices at which these 
shares were acquired.122 Managerial ownership, which is more readily ascertain-
able, may change over the course of the buyback.  Finally, and perhaps most im-
portantly, it is extremely difficult – if not impossible – to ascertain the actual value 
of a particular firm’s stock.  
                                                                                                                                                             
122  See supra Part I.C.1.  
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  Nevertheless, it is possible to get a sense of managers’ potential bargain repur-
chase profits  from  market-wide data.  One can obtain a rough estimate of the 
amount of shares managers indirectly purchase each year by multiplying their per-
centage ownership of repurchasing firms by total repurchase volume. Recall that 
U.S. companies repurchase approximately  $200 billion of shares per year.123 
Managers of repurchasing firms own an average of 15% to 20% of these firms’ eq-
uity.124 If managers own 15% of every repurchasing firm’s shares, and these firms 
collectively buy back $200 billion of stock per year, managers would indirectly buy 
$30 billion of shares annually through repurchases.  
  The difference between the repurchase price and the stock’s actual value can-
not be measured directly. But the underpricing gap can be estimated from the ab-
normal stock price returns  that follow repurchase program announcements. 
Researchers studying repurchases interpret positive post-announcement abnormal 
returns to mean that the shares were underpriced at the time of the repurchase 
program announcement. Recent studies have found that firms announcing repur-
chase programs and then repurchasing shares within the first year exhibit cumula-
tive abnormal returns of 20% to  25% in the four years following the 
announcement.125 These results suggest that the actual value of these firms’ stock 
was, on average, 20% to 25% higher than the pre-announcement trading price.  
                                                                                                                                                             
123  See supra Part I.A. 
124  See McNally, supra note 75, at 59; Vafeas, supra note 6, at 112-13. 
125  See Chan et al., supra note 83, at 2-3.  
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  Multiplying the dollar volume of managers’ indirect purchases by these ab-
normal returns yields an estimate  of  managers’ bargain repurchase  profits.  If 
managers indirectly buy $30 billion of shares each year through repurchases, firms 
conduct their share repurchases at the time they announce the buyback, and all 
repurchasing firms experience the same post-announcement abnormal returns, 
managers would earn 20% to 25% abnormal profits on their $30 billion per year of 
indirect share repurchases, or $6 to $7.5 billion annually. 
  Of course, firms announcing buyback programs do not acquire all the shares 
repurchased under the program immediately following the announcement. They 
typically repurchase shares over a several year period.126 Because the stock prices 
of these firms exhibit abnormal price increases in each of the four years following 
the announcement, the last shares repurchased are not as underpriced as the first. 
However, most shares are repurchased within several months of the repurchase 
program announcement, 127 and most of the abnormal stock price returns occur 
after that period.128 Thus, even though the stock is not all repurchased immedi-
ately after the buyback program announcement,  managers could well be making 
several billion dollars of profits each year from bargain repurchases —the same 
                                                                                                                                                             
126  See Stephens & Weisbach, supra note 6, at 323. 
127  Id. 
128   See Chan et al., supra note 83, at 27.  
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order of magnitude as the approximately $5 billion they appear to be making each 
year using inside information in their personal trading. 129 
  Obviously, this  very  preliminary estimate is subject to  many caveats.  The 
analysis assumes that economists are properly measuring post-announcement ab-
normal returns.  If abnormal returns are in fact lower, managers’ bargain repur-
chase profits would be as well.130    It  also  assumes that post-announcement 
abnormal returns and managerial ownership are identical across all repurchasing 
firms. If most repurchased shares (by dollar volume) are acquired by firms whose 
post-announcement abnormal returns or managerial ownership are relatively low, 
the actual amount diverted by managers may be lower. If, on the other hand, most 
repurchased shares are acquired by firms whose post-announcement abnormal re-
turns and managerial ownership are relatively high, the amount diverted by man-
agers may be even larger.  The important point, however, is that the amount of 
value managers divert through bargain repurchases could be quite large—on the 
order of several billion dollars per year. And this amount does not include manag-
ers’ profits from selling their shares at inflated prices following misleading repur-
chase announcements. 
                                                                                                                                                             
129  See Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability, supra note 11, at 323. 
130  As I explained in the Introduction, for purposes of this Article I generally assume that 
stock demand curves are horizontal and that repurchases therefore cannot be used to exert 
price pressure. But if stock demand curves slope downward, enabling managers to boost the 
stock price by eliminating low-value shareholders, part of the observed post-announcement 
abnormal returns may be due to price pressure rather than to underpricing.     
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  While managers’ ability to profit from bargain repurchase might be thought of 
as a form of executive compensation, this form of compensation is unlikely to 
serve public shareholders’ interest.  Like managers’ gains from personal insider 
trading, their profits from bargain repurchases are in large part a function of man-
agers’ access to inside information, not the amount of aggregate shareholder value 
they create. Indeed, as I explain in Part IV, bargain repurchases are likely to reduce 
aggregate shareholder value by distorting the firm’s payout policy.   
  This form of compensation does, however, serve managers’ interests. Bargain 
repurchases,  like personal insider trading, provide managers with  substantial 
value in a form that is likely to go unnoticed by shareholders.131 In any given 
firm, the profits are difficult to detect and measure.  Needless to say, the profits 
never  appear in any of the firm’s publicly disclosed accounting statements or 
summary executive compensation tables.  
  To be sure, managers are not the only ones benefiting from bargain repur-
chases. Nonselling public shareholders also benefit by indirectly acquiring stock 
for a low price. Indeed, if managers owned 15% of each repurchasing firm’s equity, 
these public shareholders collectively would capture 85% of bargain repurchase 
profits. On this assumption, if managers capture $5 billion annually in bargain re-
purchase profits, nonselling public shareholders would capture at least $25 billion. 
Thus, one might argue that bargain repurchases are not analogous to managers’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
131   For a discussion of the importance to executives of camouflaging their compensation, 
see BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 41, at 67, 182.  
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trading personally on inside information: unlike the case of personal insider trad-
ing, managers conducting low-price buybacks create value not only for themselves 
but for other shareholders as well. 
  The problem, however, is that the bargain repurchase profits flowing to  man-
agers and other nonselling shareholders  do not result from value creation but 
rather come at the expense of other parties. And, as I now turn to explain, these 
other parties are the public shareholders who buy and sell the firm’s shares. Thus, 
if managers capture $5 billion of bargain repurchase profits and nonselling public 
shareholders capture $25 billion, other public shareholders must lose $30 billion. 
On balance, public shareholders as a group would lose exactly the amount manag-
ers gain: $5 billion.  
 
B. The Bid-Ask Spread and the Cost to Public Shareholders 
 
  Managers’ profits from bargain repurchases and sales at inflated prices follow-
ing misleading repurchase announcements must come at someone’s expense. I first 
explain in more detail how the costs of value diversion are borne directly by public 
shareholders  or indirectly,  through a higher bid-ask spread. I then present evi-
dence  indicating  that bargain repurchases and inflated-price sales increase the 
bid-ask spread. 
 
1.  Theory  
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  We saw in Part II that bargain repurchases transfer value from parties selling 
shares to the firm. Similarly, profits from the sale of shares at a price above their 
actual value come at the expense of those buying the stock. There are likely two 
types of parties transacting directly with the firm and its managers: public inves-
tors and market makers, the professionals who facilitate trading in a firm’s stock 
by continuously offering to buy and sell shares. 
  Consider the situation in which the parties directly selling low-price stock to a 
repurchasing firm are public shareholders. In this situation, bargain repurchase 
profits come immediately at the expense of public investors. Similarly, when those 
buying  inflated-price  stock  from managers  are public shareholders, the cost of 
value diversion is borne, in the first instance, by public shareholders. In both cases, 
the transactions transfer value directly from public investors.  
  When the parties  transacting with the repurchasing firm or managers are 
market makers, the analysis is more complicated.  In these cases, bargain repur-
chases and inflated-price sales do not directly transfer value from public investors. 
Rather, they transfer value, in the first instance, from market makers. However, as 
we will see, the cost imposed on market makers by bargain repurchases and in-
flated-price sales is eventually passed on to public investors through a wider bid-
ask spread. Thus, in the end, public shareholders bear the cost of value diversion 
through reduced liquidity.  
  We saw earlier that the bid-ask spread compensates the market maker for the 
various costs associated with market making and provides the market maker with  
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a profit.132  Repurchases may have liquidity-increasing effects – effects that tend 
to reduce the bid-ask spread. For example, by increasing trading volume, buybacks 
may lower market makers’ inventory costs, enabling them to narrow the spread, 
everything else being equal. Indeed, there is evidence that, in certain cases, repur-
chases do narrow the bid-ask spread.133 
  But when repurchases are used for informed trading, and repurchase program 
announcements are used to allow managers to sell at inflated prices, there is likely 
to be an additional effect – called adverse selection -- that tends to increase market 
makers’ costs, and therefore the bid-ask spread. Adverse selection arises when 
market makers trade with better-informed parties, such as firms conducting bar-
gain repurchases and managers selling at a high price.  On average, market makers 
lose money trading with such parties.  Market makers must widen their bid-ask 
spread to compensate for these losses. In turn, this increases public shareholders’ 
trading costs, reducing their net returns. 134 To the extent market makers trading 
with the firm and its managers pass on the cost of adverse selection to public in-
vestors through a higher bid-ask spread, public investors indirectly pay for the 
profits managers capture directly from market makers. 135    
                                                                                                                                                             
132  See supra Part I.B.4. 
133 See Cook et al., supra note 31, at 485-86. . 
134 See Barclay & Smith, supra note 6, at 66, 71 (concluding that in OMRs, the bid-ask spread 
widens, liquidity is reduced, and the firm suffers, on average, a reduction in equity value of 
8% because managers use OMRs to transfer value from public shareholders).  
135 Market makers would bear any of the costs not passed along to public investors.   
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  To be sure, public shareholders do not bear the entire cost of a higher bid-ask 
spread. When managers buy or sell shares themselves, or indirectly acquire these 
shares through a repurchase they directly bear part of this cost.  And to the extent 
managers absorb part of this cost, their net profits from bargain repurchases and 
inflated-price sales decline.  However, managers’ personal and indirect trades are 
likely to represent only a tiny fraction of total trading volume  One study, for ex-
ample, reports that in U.S. public firms manager trades make up only about 1.5% 
of total trading volume.136  Accordingly, the cost of the higher bid-ask spread can 
be expected to fall mostly on public shareholders. Thus, either directly or indi-
rectly, managers’ profits from bargain repurchases and inflated-price sales come 
largely at public investors’ expense.   
                                                                                                                                                             
136  See Seyhun, supra note 71, at 168.    
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2.  Evidence 
 
  There are several studies on the effect of repurchases on the bid-ask spread.  
These studies’ findings are consistent with bargain repurchases and inflated-price 
sales increasing the bid-ask spread and reducing public shareholders’ net returns.   
    As Part III.B.1. explained, r epurchases can influence the bid-ask spread 
through a variety of mechanisms.  Some of repurchases’ effects tend to increase 
liquidity. For example, by increasing trading volume, a repurchase can lower mar-
ket makers’ inventory costs, allowing them to narrow the bid-ask spread every-
thing else being equal.  To the extent bargain repurchases create adverse selection, 
however, that effect will tend to increase the bid-ask spread.   
  Because non-bargain repurchases do not give rise to adverse selection, one 
would expect them to have only liquidity-increasing effects. Accordingly, their use 
can be expected to reduce the bid-ask spread.  Indeed, there is evidence consistent 
with non-bargain repurchases reducing the bid-ask spread.137  
                                                                                                                                                             
137 See Cook et al., supra note 31, at 485-86  (finding that bid-ask spreads decreased when 
certain firms repurchased shares). The study looks at repurchase transactions that were  
disclosed voluntarily by a small group of US firms. Id., at 463, 464-66. The researchers 
solicited repurchase data for 478 firms identified as announcing repurchase programs 
between March 10, 1993 and March 4, 1994. Only sixty-eight responded, and of those, four 
indicated that they were unable or unwilling to provide the data, leaving only sixty-four firms 
in the sample. Managers engaging in informed trading are unlikely to disclose trading data, 
even to researchers, because of the risk (however small) of insider trading liability. 
Accordingly, the 15% or so of the firms that responded positively to requests for such 
information are likely to be firms that were not using repurchases to engage in informed 
trading.   
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  However, a priori, one cannot make the opposite prediction about bargain re-
purchases. Although bargain repurchases’ adverse selection effect tends to widen 
the bid-ask spread, everything else being equal, these repurchases are also likely to 
reduce market makers’ inventory costs, which could have a countervailing effect.  
If the inventory-cost effect is sufficiently strong, even bargain repurchases might, 
like non-bargain repurchases, reduce the bid-ask spread. (They would, of course, 
not reduce the bid-ask spread by as much as non-bargain repurchases.) Accord-
ingly, one could not conclude from a  finding that bargain repurchases reduce the 
bid-ask spread  that there is no adverse selection effect on the bid-ask spread; the 
bid-ask spread – and shareholders’ trading costs -- could have been even lower ab-
sent the insider trading effect of bargain repurchases.   
  Similarly, if repurchases in aggregate -- which consist of both bargain and non-
bargain repurchases on – tend to reduce the bid-ask spread, one could not conclude 
that bargain repurchases do not give rise to an adverse selection effect.  Such a 
finding could indicate that the liquidity-reducing adverse selection effect of bar-
gain repurchases is overwhelmed by the inventory-cost (and any other liquidity-
increasing) effects of both bargain and non-bargain repurchases.  Absent adverse 
selection, the effect of aggregate repurchases on the bid-ask spread would have 
been even more positive.  
  Nevertheless, a finding that  repurchases in aggregate do not reduce the bid-
ask spread would indicate not only that bargain repurchases create an adverse se-
lection effect but that this spread-widening effect offsets the inventory-cost (and 
possible other liquidity boosting) effects of both bargain and non-bargain repur-
chases.    And a finding that repurchases in the aggregate i ncrease the bid-ask  
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spread would mean that bargain repurchases’ adverse selection effect actually 
overwhelms the liquidity boosting effects of both bargain and non-bargain repur-
chases.  Thus, while a finding that aggregate repurchases narrow the bid-ask 
spread does not rule out the possibility of adverse selection, a finding that aggre-
gate repurchases increase the bid-ask spread strongly suggests that there is not 
only an adverse selection effect but that the effect is extremely strong. 
   In fact, all of the studies exploring the effect of repurchase activity indicate 
that, in the aggregate, the adverse selection effect of bargain repurchases either 
offsets  or overwhelms  any  liquidity-boosting effects of both bargain and non-
bargain repurchases.  Three studies focus on changes in the bid-ask spread in the 
period  following repurchase program announcements by U.S. firms, when pre-
sumably many of the announcing firms have begun repurchasing shares.  Two 
studies find no change in the bid-ask spread, 138 suggesting that the adverse selec-
tion effect of bargain repurchases offsets the potential liquidity-boosting effects of 
bargain and non-bargain repurchases; one finds an increase in the bid-ask spread, 
139 suggesting that the adverse selection effect of bargain repurchases outweighs 
the aggregate liquidity-increasing effects of bargain and non-bargain repurchases.   
                                                                                                                                                             
138  See Singh et al., supra note 46 (examining 181 repurchase announcements during the 
period between 1983 and 1990 and finding that the bid-ask spread did not change when 
firms announced repurchases); see also James M. Miller & John M. McConnell, Open-Market 
Share Repurchase Programs and Bid-Ask Spreads on the NYSE: Implications for Corporate Payout 
Policy, 30 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 365, 367 (1995)(similar). 
139   See Barclay & Smith, supra note 6, at 66, 71 (finding that the bid-ask spread widened, on 
average, following 244 repurchase announcements by 198 NYSE-listed firms between 1970 
and 1978).  
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    Because U.S. firms are not required to report their daily repurchase activity, 
there is little evidence on how actual repurchase activity in U.S. market affects the 
bid-ask spread.140 However, evidence from two foreign markets where all firms 
must report daily repurchases suggests that the adverse selection effect of bargain 
repurchases more than offsets any liquidity-enhancing benefits bargain and non-
bargain repurchases might offer. A study of repurchases in Hong Kong found that 
the bid-ask spread widens by an average of 10% on the days that firms repurchase 
shares.141 Similarly, a recent study of repurchases on the Paris Stock Exchange 
found that repurchase activity widens bid-ask spreads by 6 to 15%. 142 These two 
studies indicate that not only do bargain repurchases generate an adverse selection 
effect but that the effect is large enough to swamp the otherwise l iquidity-
enhancing effects of bargain and non-bargain repurchases. In short, all of the em-
pirical studies point to the insider trading effect of bargain repurchases increasing 
the bid-ask spread, thereby shifting to public shareholders market makers’ adverse 
selection costs.  We now turn to consider the additional costs that bargain repur-
chases can impose on public shareholders.  
                                                                                                                                                             
   
140  The one U.S. study that looks at actual repurchases is the Cook et. al. study, which relies 
on voluntary reporting and is therefore not a random sample of repurchasing firms. See Cook 
et al., supra note 31, at 485-86.   
141  Trading depth (the number of shares offered or sought at the ask and bid prices, 
respectively) also drops significantly on the day of the repurchase. Brockman & Chung, supra 
note 84, at 441. 
142  See Edith Ginglinger & Jacques Hamon,  Actual Share Repurchases and Corporate 
Liquidity 19 (Sept. 2003) (working paper ), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=557233.  
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IV. Additional Costs: Payout Distortions  
  We have seen that managers can and do use bargain repurchases and mislead-
ing repurchase announcements to systematically transfer value from public share-
holders. If such opportunistic behavior did not affect aggregate shareholder value, 
it would  merely  effect a zero-sum wealth transfer.  Public shareholders’ losses 
would equal insiders’ gains – as much as several billion dollars annually from bar-
gain repurchases alone.  
  However, as this Part shows, the use of low-price repurchases is likely to dis-
tort corporate payout and investment decisions, substantially reducing aggregate 
shareholder value and imposing additional costs on public shareholders.  In other 
words, every $1 billion of managerial profits is likely to cost public shareholders 
much more than $1 billion. 
  Managers’ ability to use repurchases for informed trading may lead to three 
types of payout decisions. Part IV. A describes how the prospect of future bargain 
repurchases can cause managers to hoard cash they should distribute to share-
holders. Part IV. B shows that managers’ ability to use repurchases for informed 
trading can also lead to cash squandering and underinvestment. Part IV. C ex- 
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plains that managers may also have an incentive to use repurchases when divi-
dends would be more efficient.   
  I conclude in Part IV. D by considering two possible arguments that bargain 
repurchases might improve payout policy and actually increase aggregate share-
holder value: (1) that bargain repurchases may mitigate managers’ tendency to re-
tain too much cash; and (2) that share repurchase announcements’ positive effects 
on stock prices suggest that bargain repurchases benefit all shareholders.  I show 
that managers’ use of repurchases for informed trading is unlikely to benefit share-
holders by reducing excess cash retention, and that bargain repurchases’ effects  
cannot be inferred from the market’s average reaction to share repurchase an-
nouncements. Indeed, I show that repurchase announcements could  boost the 
stock price even in a hypothetical world where all repurchases reduce aggregate 
shareholder value.    
A. Cash Hoarding  
 
  I have shown that a  repurchase  is economically equivalent to non-selling 
shareholders acquiring stock from sellers and the firm then issuing a dividend.143  
Thus, like a dividend, a repurchase moves cash from firm projects to investments 
outside the firm. But unlike a dividend, a repurchase also transfers value between 
sellers and non-selling shareholders whenever the stock is mispriced. If the stock is 
overpriced, the repurchase transfers value to sellers from non-selling shareholders. 
                                                                                                                                                             
143  See Part II.A.1.  
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If the stock is underpriced, the repurchase transfers value from sellers to non-
selling shareholders.  
  From an aggregate shareholder perspective, a firm  should distribute cash, 
whether through a repurchase or a dividend, only if the cash can generate higher 
returns outside the firm. If the firm uses a repurchase, any value-transferring ef-
fect should be disregarded.  It merely shifts wealth from one set of shareholders to 
another without increasing value for shareholders as a group.  
  However, in making payout decisions, managers are likely to focus not on ag-
gregate shareholder value but rather on what benefits them personally. And man-
agers can profit by retaining their shares and having the firm buy stock at a low 
price. Thus, managers with inside information have an incentive to manipulate the 
timing and amount of cash distributions, causing payout policy to deviate from 
what would maximize aggregate shareholder value.  
  The first potential distortion to payout policy is that the prospect of future bar-
gain repurchase opportunities might lead managers to retain rather than distrib-
ute excess cash. By hoarding cash, managers give themselves the ability to 
repurchase shares in the future should the stock become underpriced. Thus, in de-
ciding whether to pay out cash now, managers will take into account the possible 
private benefit of retaining the cash for future bargain repurchases. The prospect 
of such opportunities, in turn, can bias managers toward retaining excess cash 
rather than paying it out. 
  To be sure, the anticipated private benefits from future bargain repurchases 
may not always be sufficiently large to induce managers to retain cash. If the cash 
would generate very low returns trapped in the firm, the prospects of underpricing  
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are not great, or the returns from investing the cash outside the firm are suffi-
ciently high, managers will distribute the cash even though it reduces their ability 
to later engage in bargain repurchases. However, on the margin, retaining the abil-
ity to buy the stock at a bargain price may cause managers to inefficiently hoard 
cash.  
   A simple numerical example illustrates this point. Suppose that managers 
own 20% of ABC Corporation’s shares. ABC has $100 million in idle cash that 
earns the firm 5% annually in a money market account. If the cash were distrib-
uted, shareholders could invest it in projects that would earn 10% per year. The 
managers must decide whether to distribute the $100 million on January 1 or at 
the end of the year, on December 31. Shareholders would enjoy an aggregate bene-
fit of $5 million ($10 million less $5 million) if the money were distributed on 
January 1. Suppose further that on December 31 of that year, the stock might be 
underpriced or overpriced. If ABC were to keep the $100 million in cash, assume 
there would be a 40% chance that it could buy back $100 million of stock that is ac-
tually worth $125 million.  
  For ABC shareholders as a group, ABC’s decision to buy $125 million of stock 
from sellers for $100 million has an expected value of $0. To the extent that the 
sellers are the firm’s own investors, the bargain repurchase represents a mere 
transfer of value among shareholders. To the extent that the sellers are market 
makers, they will raise their bid-ask spread to compensate themselves for the ex-
pected loss from selling at a low price to the firm, passing the costs on to the firm’s 
shareholders when they sell or buy more stock.  Therefore, from an aggregate  
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shareholder perspective, the value-maximizing strategy would be to distribute the 
cash on January 1 so that it could earn shareholders an extra $5 million. 
  Now consider managers’ incentives. If ABC were to issue a $100 million divi-
dend on January 1, managers would receive $20 million (20% of $100 million) and 
invest it at 10% during the year, leaving them with $22 million on December 31. If 
ABC were to retain the cash, the firm would earn $5 million in interest on the 
funds, of which managers’ pro rata share would be $1 million. But, with 40% prob-
ability, managers and remaining shareholders could use the $100 million at the 
end of the year to purchase $125 million in stock from sellers, yielding an addi-
tional $25 million (20% of $125 million) for managers. With 60% probability, the 
firm  would simply retain the $100 million, of which managers’ pro rata share 
would be $20 million. Thus, the expected value to managers of retaining the $100 
million of cash is $23 million ($1 million + 40% x $25 million + 60% x $20 million), 
which exceeds by $1 million the value to managers of distributing the cash on 
January 1.144 
                                                                                                                                                             
144  If capital markets were perfect, this payout distortion would not arise. With frictionless 
capital markets, ABC’s managers could distribute the $100 million on January 1, enabling 
shareholders to earn higher returns on the cash outside the firm, and then—if the stock were 
underpriced—borrow $100 million on December 31 to fund a repurchase. However, as 
economists have long understood, capital markets do not work perfectly. Borrowing takes 
time, involves transaction costs, and is not always feasible. For example, loan covenants with 
existing lenders might bar ABC from borrowing an additional $100 million. Risk-averse 
managers fearful of financial distress may prefer not to increase the firm’s debt and interest 
burden. Thus, managers hoping to engage in informed trading with stock buybacks cannot 
always expect to borrow the necessary funds should a bargain repurchase opportunity arise. 
As a result, they will have an incentive to retain excess cash even when distributing the cash 
to shareholders would increase aggregate shareholder value.  
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  This example also illustrates how the use of bargain repurchases imposes costs 
on shareholders beyond the value transferred to managers. The repurchase itself 
transfers $25 million from sellers to managers and other remaining shareholders, 
of which managers capture 20%, or $5 million. Thus, the repurchase directly or in-
directly transfers $5 million from public shareholders to managers.  However, 
managers’ ability to engage in bargain repurchases costs public shareholders far 
more than $5 million. The prospect of such a repurchase causes managers to retain 
$100 million that could be earning $5 million more outside of the firm. Public 
shareholders own 80% of the firm and, accordingly, bear an opportunity cost of $4 
million. Thus, if managers engage in a bargain repurchase, the total cost to public 
shareholders is $9 million, almost twice as much as the amount of value trans-
ferred to managers through the repurchase. 
   
B. Cash Squandering and Underinvestment 
 
  Just as future bargain repurchases can cause managers to retain cash that, 
from  an aggregate shareholder perspective, should be distributed immediately, 
the possibility of immediate profits from informed repurchasing can cause manag-
ers to distribute cash that should be invested in the firm’s own projects. Thus, the 
second problem with linking payout policy to the stock price is that it can encour-
age managers to “squander cash”—that is, to pay out too much.  
  Again, in making payout decisions, managers focus on what makes them better 
off, not on what maximizes the aggregate shareholder value. In deciding whether  
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to pay out excess cash, managers consider whether their private information indi-
cates that the stock is underpriced. If so, this may lead them to buy back stock even 
when the cash would generate more value for shareholders as a group if left in the 
firm. 
  Consider a variation on the previous example. Again, suppose that managers 
own 20% of ABC’s shares; ABC has $100 million of cash; and managers must de-
cide whether to distribute the $100 million on January 1 or at the end of the year, 
on December 31. Now suppose, however, that if the money remains in the firm 
ABC could invest it in projects that would earn 10% during the year. If the cash 
were distributed on January 1, shareholders could earn a return of 5% outside the 
firm.  Retaining the cash would thus increase shareholder value by $5 million. 
Suppose further that on January 1, the stock is underpriced: with the $100 million 
ABC could buy back stock worth $125 million.  
  Again, for shareholders as a group, the ability of the firm to buy $125 million of 
stock from sellers for $100 million has an expected value of $0. To the extent that 
the sellers are the firm’s own investors, the bargain repurchase represents a mere 
transfer of value among shareholders. To the extent the sellers are market makers, 
they will raise their bid-ask spread to compensate themselves for the expected loss 
from selling at a low price to the firm, passing the cost onto the firm’s sharehold-
ers.  From an aggregate shareholder perspective, the value-maximizing strategy 
would be to retain the cash and invest it in ABC’s projects to earn shareholders an 
extra $5 million. 
  Consider managers’ incentives. If on January 1, ABC repurchases for $100 mil-
lion stock worth $125 million, managers reap $5 million of profit (20% of $25 mil- 
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lion). If ABC retains the cash, the firm earns a return of $10 million on the funds, of 
which managers’ pro rata share is $2 million. Thus, it is in managers’ interest to 
repurchase the stock even though—from an aggregate shareholder perspective—it 
is desirable for ABC to retain the cash.145   
    As in the case of cash hoarding, the cost to public shareholders from cash 
squandering exceeds the amount of value transferred to managers. Returning to 
the example, ABC’s repurchase transfers $5 million from public shareholders to 
managers. But the cost to shareholders as a group (including managers) of distrib-
uting cash prematurely is $5 million. Of this $5 million cost, public shareholders 
bear 80% (or $4 million).  Thus, managers’ $5 million of insider trading profits cost 
public shareholders a total of $9 million.  
  There is evidence consistent with at least some repurchases squandering cash  
After repurchases, operating profits tend to decline. Moreover, the operating prof-
its of firms that are more likely to be engaged in information-based trading—that 
is, those that repurchase infrequently, have greater information asymmetry, and 
have more managerial ownership—tend to decline more than others.146 Econo-
mists have found it “surprising” that there is no evidence of improved operating 
                                                                                                                                                             
145  Of course, a firm might be able to borrow money to fund the repurchase, which would 
ameliorate the problem of distributing cash that would be better invested in the corporation. 
But as I have explained, borrowing might be difficult, impossible, or take so much time that 
the underpricing might disappear. Even if borrowing were possible, managers might prefer 
not to increase the firm’s debt burden and the likelihood of financial distress, which are 
sometimes personally costly for them. 
146 See Jagannathan & Stephens, supra note 6, at 83.  
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performance following repurchases.147 The analysis I offer suggests that this 
could be the consequence of cash squandering. 
    
C. Distorted  Form of Payout 
 
  The use of repurchases for informed trading can distort not only the amount 
and timing of cash distributions, but also the form these payouts take. In particu-
lar, managers may choose to use repurchases to distribute cash rather than divi-
dends, even when dividends would be more efficient.  
  As we saw in Part I.B, repurchases may sometimes offer advantages over divi-
dends.  Repurchases may be more tax-efficient for shareholders. For small, non-
recurring payouts, a buyback may also involve lower transactions than dividends. 
Repurchases, unlike dividends, can also be used to acquire shares for employee 
stock option programs.  
  However, the continuing widespread use of dividends suggests that dividends 
are often more efficient than repurchases.  Managers  are  biased toward repur-
chases because repurchases can provide private benefits that dividends cannot, 
such as informed trading profits.148  Thus, managers will choose dividends over 
                                                                                                                                                             
147 See id. 
148  Repurchases are likely to provide managers other private benefits.  If the demand curve 
for shares slopes downward, managers can use repurchases to boost the stock price before 
selling their own shares.  And, because of the structure of managers’ options,  the distribution 
of cash through repurchases tends to increase the value of their equity compensation while  
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repurchases  only  when  dividends’  are substantially more efficient than repur-
chases. The fact that firms continue to use dividends—indeed, most firms that re-
purchase shares also issue dividends149—suggests that, at least in some cases, the 
efficiency advantages of dividends may be substantial.     
  While a full discussion of dividends’ possible advantages is beyond the scope 
of this Article, it is worth noting one such advantage: that, particularly for larger 
payouts, dividends are likely to involve significantly lower transaction costs than 
repurchases. As noted in Part I.B.2, when a firm distributes cash through a repur-
chase, it incurs brokerage fees.  So do selling shareholders. If the repurchase is me-
diated through a market maker, the firm and selling shareholders also bear the 
cost of the bid-ask spread. These transaction costs tend to increase with the dollar 
amount of the payout.  
  In contrast, the transaction costs associated with dividends are largely small 
and fixed. Firms must compute the amount to be paid to each shareholder and 
mail out the checks. These costs, which are modest, do not increase with the dollar 
amount distributed. In fact, employees of the investor relations and shareholder 
services departments of a number of publicly traded firms report that the cost of 
issuing dividends is too small to track.  For large payouts, then, dividends are likely 
to involve lower per-dollar transaction costs than repurchases.150   
                                                                                                                                                             
dividends reduce it.  See WEISBENNER, supra note 6, at 9-10; Fenn & Liang, supra note 6; Jolls, 
supra note 6, at 22-24.       
149 See Grullon & Michaely, supra note 1. 
150  Some economists have argued that dividends impose transaction costs on shareholders 
by forcing non-liquidity seeking shareholders to reinvest the cash in stock of either that firm  
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  To be sure, there may well be cases where a dividend is more transaction-cost 
efficient but a repurchase still makes shareholders better off because of one of its 
other advantages.  The important point, however, is that the widespread use of 
dividends suggests that, in many cases, dividends are a more efficient payout form 
than repurchases. And, to the extent managers can profit from bargain repur-
chases, they may decide to use repurchases even when dividends are more effi-
cient.  In such a case, managers’ ability to engage in bargain repurchases may lead 
not only to cash squandering or cash hoarding, but also to the use of an inefficient 
payout form.   
 
D. Could Bargain Repurchases Actually Improve Payout Policy? 
 
  We now turn to consider two possible arguments that bargain repurchases 
might in fact improve payout policy and increase aggregate shareholder value: (1) 
that bargain repurchases may mitigate managers’ tendency to retain excess cash; 
and (2) that share repurchase announcements’ positive effect on stock prices sug-
gests that bargain repurchases benefit all shareholders.  As we will see, however, 
                                                                                                                                                             
or another firm. See Edwin J. Elton & Martin J. Gruber, The Effect of Share Repurchase on the 
Value of the Firm, 23 J. Fin. 135 (1968). Distributing cash through a repurchase instead of a 
dividend might reduce the transaction costs borne by this group of shareholders. However, 
institutional investors (such as mutual funds) constantly distribute cash to and receive cash 
from investors. Thus, the marginal transaction costs of processing cash dividends is likely to 
be trivial.  The widespread availability of dividend reinvestment programs also makes it easy 
for shareholders who do not want liquidity to avoid the transaction costs associated with 
reinvesting unwanted cash.  
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managers’ use of repurchases for informed trading is unlikely to benefit share-
holders by reducing excess cash retention, and bargain repurchases’ effects cannot 
be inferred from the market’s average reaction to share repurchase announce-
ments. Indeed, I show that repurchase announcements could boost the stock price 
even in a hypothetical world where all repurchases reduce aggregate shareholder 
value.     
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  1.  Inducing the Distribution of Excess Cash 
 
  Managers generally have a strong incentive to retain excess cash—cash not 
needed to fund any desirable investment opportunities the firm might have—
rather than distribute it to shareholders.151 The cash enables them to expand their 
corporate empire and thereby increase their perks and prestige. The funds also 
provide a cushion in the event of a downturn, reducing the cost to managers of 
performing poorly.  
  Managers’ ability to profit from bargain repurchases might counteract their 
tendency to retain excess cash by “rewarding” them for distributing it. Distribut-
ing excess cash imposes a cost on managers by reducing their ability to build em-
pires and cushion themselves from poor performance. But in some cases managers’ 
profits from low-price repurchases might be high enough to offset these costs, mo-
tivating managers to distribute the cash. 
  One cannot rule out the possibility that, at least in some cases, bargain repur-
chases reduce excessive cash retention. However, both theory and empirical data 
suggest that bargain repurchases are unlikely to substantially mitigate this prob-
lem market-wide.  As a matter of theory, tying payout policy to managers’ inside 
information can lead both to cash squandering—the problem of over-payout—and 
                                                                                                                                                             
151 See generally Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers, 76 Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American 
Economic Association 323-24 (May  1986).  
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to cash hoarding—the problem of under-payout. To the extent that the prospect of 
future bargain repurchase opportunities leads to cash hoarding, managers’ ability 
to engage in such repurchases does not mitigate the problem of free cash retention. 
Indeed, it exacerbates the problem.  
  Empirically, there is little evidence indicating that the increasing use of repur-
chases over the last twenty years (many of which have been information-driven) 
has led to a reduction in excess cash holdings. If repurchases caused managers to 
distribute more excess cash than dividends, one would expect payout rates to have 
increased as managers substituted repurchases for dividends. However, aggregate 
payout data suggests the increasing use of share repurchases is not boosting pay-
outs.  Between 1974 and 1998, the average repurchase-payout to earnings ratio 
across firms—the amount of cash distributed through share repurchases divided 
by earnings—increased from 3.7% to 13.6%, and the average dividend-payout to 
earnings ratio declined from 22.3% to 13.8%.152 Yet the average (total) payout to 
earnings ratio for publicly traded U.S. firms remained fairly constant during that 
period, hovering around 26% to 28%.153 Thus, the data do not appear to indicate 
that bargain repurchases have reduced managers’ incentive to retain too much 
cash.154  On balance, then, information-driven repurchases are likely to worsen, 
rather than improve, corporate payout policy. 
                                                                                                                                                             
152 See Grullon & Ikenberry, supra note 3, at 41. 
153 Id.  
154  To be sure, the fact that the payout to earnings ratio has remained stable for twenty-five 
years does not necessarily mean that managers’ tendency to hoard excess cash has remained  
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2. Bargain Repurchases’ Desirability: What Can Announcement Returns 
Tell Us? 
 
  I have explained how the use of bargain repurchases not only systematically 
diverts value from public shareholders, but is also likely to distort managers’ pay-
out and investment decisions, shrinking the size of the pie.  One might wonder 
how this finding can be reconciled with the fact that, on average,  repurchase pro-
gram announcements boost the stock price, albeit only slightly. Below, I explain 
why the market’s reaction to such announcements provides little information on 
bargain repurchases’ desirability.  Indeed, I show that stock prices could rise fol-
lowing repurchase program announcements even in a world where all buybacks 
are known to  be bargain repurchases that destroy  large amounts of aggregate 
shareholder value.  
    The market’s  slightly positive  reaction to repurchase  program  announce-
ments sheds little light on the way bargain repurchases and inflated-price sales af-
fect aggregate shareholder value for three reasons.  First,  it is unlikely that all 
                                                                                                                                                             
unchanged. During this period, managers may have been able to find more productive uses 
for their firms’ cash.  Thus, the amount of excess cash at managers’ disposal might have de-
clined even as payout rates stayed constant, which would be consistent with repurchases 
boosting payouts of excess cash. However, the opposite story could be true. Excess cash may 
have increased over time, in which case constant payout rates would be consistent with re-
purchases reducing payouts. The important point is that aggregate payout data do not pro-
vide any prima facie evidence that the increasing use of repurchases has reduced the problem 
of excessive cash retention.  
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repurchase program announcements herald bargain repurchases (or inflated-price 
sales).  As I indicated in the Introduction, many repurchases may well be share-
holder-serving.  Accordingly, in any given sample of repurchase announcements, 
there are likely to be at least some shareholder-serving repurchases.  The fact that 
repurchase program announcements are greeted positively on average could at 
most mean that the expected benefits of shareholder-serving repurchases slightly 
outweigh the costs of bargain repurchases (and managers’ inflated-price sales that 
might follow these announcements).  It certainly does not mean that market par-
ticipants believe that every repurchase benefits shareholders.  Thus, the market’s 
slightly positive average reaction to repurchase program announcements is not in-
consistent with bargain repurchases imposing costs on shareholders -- or even 
with those costs being quite large. 
  Second, managers’ use of information-based repurchases can give rise to costs, 
such as cash hoarding, that are incurred even before a repurchase occurs and thus 
are not reflected in the market’s reaction to a repurchase program announcement.  
As we saw in Part III. A, managers who believe their stock is likely to become un-
derpriced may have an incentive to retain cash that should, from an aggregate 
shareholder perspective, be distributed immediately to shareholders. The cost to 
shareholders of this cash hoarding is incurred before any repurchase is actually 
announced.  Should the firm announce a repurchase program, this ex ante cost 
would therefore not be reflected in the market’s reaction to the announcement. In-
deed, the higher this cash-hoarding cost is, the stronger the stock market’s reaction 
to the announcement will be; the announcement will signal not only that the stock 
is underpriced, but also that the excess cash that has been sitting idly in the firm  
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will finally be distributed to investors. Paradoxically, then, the greater the cost that 
cash-hoarding imposes on shareholders, the more positive the stock market’s reac-
tion to a repurchase announcement will be. As a result, the price reaction to the 
announcement will fail to reflect the overall effect of bargain repurchases on ag-
gregate shareholder value.  Thus even in a world consisting only of bargain repur-
chases, one could not infer from the stock market’s slightly positive reaction to 
repurchase program announcements that managers’ ability to conduct these re-
purchases benefits shareholders.   
  Third, even if share repurchases did not give rise to any ex ante costs such as 
cash hoarding, the market’s slightly positive reaction to share repurchase an-
nouncements would not mean that share repurchases, even on average, increase 
aggregate shareholder value.  In fact, the market’s positive reaction could be  con-
sistent with all share repurchases destroying aggregate shareholder value.  To see 
this, consider a world in which all announced repurchases are bargain repurchases 
that cause managers to squander cash that, from an aggregate shareholder per-
spective, should be retained by the firm. Even in such a world, a share repurchase 
announcement could cause the stock price to increase.  The reason is as follows: the 
stock market’s reaction to a repurchase program announcement reflects at least 
two things: (1) the arrival of new information indicating that the company is likely 
worth more than was previously believed; and (2) the perceived effect of the an-
nounced repurchase on the company’s value.  As long as the cash-squandering re-
purchase destroys less value than  the  amount of underpricing revealed by the 
announcement, the stock market’s reaction will be positive.  Thus, one cannot infer  
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from the price-boosting effect of repurchase announcements that they increase 
value.   
  To see how the announcement of a value-destroying repurchase could boost 
the stock price, consider the following example. Suppose XYZ Corporation’s shares 
are worth e ither $8 or $12, with equal probability. Assume that if the stock is 
worth $12, there is a 30% chance that XYZ will announce a repurchase tomorrow 
and then repurchase shares. If the stock is worth $8, there is a 10% chance that 
XYZ will announce a repurchase tomorrow to boost the stock price so that manag-
ers can sell their shares. Finally, suppose that if XYZ actually conducts a repur-
chase, it will reduce the value of each share from $12 to $11 by squandering 
needed cash.  
  If the firm announces a repurchase, the market will infer that the expected 
value of the stock is $10.25.155  If the firm fails to announce a repurchase, the 
stock price will drop to $9.75.156 There is an 80% likelihood of no repurchase an-
nouncement and a 20% likelihood of a repurchase announcement.157 The stock 
will therefore trade at $9.85 per share today. As a result, the stock price will rise 
$0.40—from $9.85 per share to $10.25 per share—if the repurchase is announced 
                                                                                                                                                             
155 The expected value of XYZ’s stock, given the repurchase announcement, is (0.30 x $11 + 
0.10 x $8)/(0.30 + 0.10).  
156 The expected value of ABC’s stock, given the lack of a repurchase announcement, is (0.70 
x $12 + 0.90 x $8)/(0.70 + 0.90).  
157  The likelihood of a repurchase announcement is (0.50)(0.30) + (0.50)(0.10), or 20%. The 
likelihood of no announcement is therefore 80%.   
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tomorrow. This increase occurs even though the market understands that, should 
the firm repurchase shares, per share value will decrease from $12 to $11.  
  I am not claiming that all (or even most) repurchases reduce aggregate share-
holder value; rather, my claim is that when repurchases can be used to buy stock at 
a low price, managers may have an incentive to squander cash, and that, even in a 
hypothetical world in which all repurchases squander cash and thus reduce ag-
gregate shareholder value, repurchase announcements might nevertheless elicit a 
positive reaction from investors. Thus, the increase in stock price that typically fol-
lows a repurchase announcement does not demonstrate that bargain repurchases 
(or repurchases on average) actually increase aggregate shareholder value.   
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V. Pre-Repurchase Disclosure 
    
  We have seen that managers can and do use bargain repurchases and mislead-
ing repurchase announcements to enrich themselves at other investors’ expense, 
which can lead to  distorted payout decisions and lower aggregate shareholder 
value.  This Part  puts forward a new approach to regulating repurchases that 
would substantially diminish managers’ ability to profit from bargain repurchases 
and misleading repurchase announcements and thereby improve corporate payout 
policy.  Part V. A describes the proposed rule: requiring firms to disclose the exact 
details of repurchase orders before their brokers execute them. Part V. B explains 
how pre-repurchase disclosure would make it more difficult for managers to use 
repurchases for informed trading and misleading repurchase announcement to ar-
tificially boost the stock price before selling their shares.   As Part V. C explains, the 
potential costs of the proposed rule are minimal. Pre-repurchase disclosure would 
neither  undermine  the potential benefits of share repurchases  nor  discourage 
managers from undertaking shareholder-serving buybacks.  
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A. The Proposed Rule 
 
  Firms are currently required to announce  intended  repurchases only when 
their boards a pprove a buyback program.158  These announcements are often 
vague, and never commit the firm to a specific course of action.  Firms sometimes 
indicate the number of shares targeted, the approximate amount to be spent on re-
purchases, or the anticipated length of the repurchase program. But these details—
if they are offered at all—do not commit managers to repurchase a single share, let 
alone indicate the price at which shares would be acquired. Indeed, many firms 
announce a repurchase and then fail to buy back a single share.159  
  My proposal would require managers to provide detailed information to the 
public about repurchases before they conduct them. In particular, managers would 
announce the specific purchase instructions given to their firm’s broker before the 
broker executes the buy order. For example, a firm wishing to instruct its broker 
“to buy up to 200,000 shares over the next five trading days at a price of $25 or 
better” would disclose that exact instruction to the market before the broker could 
begin buying shares. In addition, firms would be required to file pre-repurchase 
                                                                                                                                                             
158  See supra Part I.C.1. 
159 See supra Part I.C.1  
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announcements with the SEC's publicly-accessible Electronic Data Gathering and 
Retrieval System (EDGAR).  
  When announcing a repurchase order, managers could include any other in-
formation that they wish to communicate to the market. For example, managers 
could announce that the repurchase is intended to acquire shares for employee 
stock option programs. To the extent market participants consider this additional 
information credible,  they  might respond differently to the announced order. 
Managers could also  use the required pre-repurchase announcement to make 
binding commitments about future buybacks.  For example, managers could indi-
cate that they will not repurchase more than a certain amount of shares over a 
specified period.      
  As Part V. B explains in greater detail, market participants would use the dis-
closed repurchase orders, along with any other information provided by the firm, 
to update their assessment of the stock’s actual value, taking into account the 
firm’s repurchase history and financial condition, as well as managers’ credibility 
and their contemporaneous and previous personal trading. To the extent a disclo-
sure signals the stock is underpriced, market participants would bid up the price of 
the stock before the repurchase order is executed. This adjustment would, in turn, 
reduce managers’ bargain repurchase profits.  
  Enforcement of the rule would be straightforward. Firms would be required to 
report each completed transaction on the SEC’s EDGAR system, including the 
price at which the repurchase was executed and the order with which it was asso-
ciated. Substantial discrepancies between trades and announced orders would give 
rise to penalties.  
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    The information, if any, transmitted  by a pre-repurchase announcement 
may not be instantly incorporated into the stock price.  Disclosure should thus be 
made at least several days in advance of trade execution. The more efficient the 
market is at reacting to this type of information, the shorter the notice period need 
be, everything else being equal. As I now turn to explain, the market’s reaction to 
repurchase orders will, over time, reduce the costs to public shareholders of bar-
gain repurchases and inflated-price sales following misleading repurchase an-
nouncements.   
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B. Benefits of Pre-Repurchase Disclosure  
 
  This Section describes the benefits of pre-repurchase disclosure. It first shows 
that pre-repurchase disclosure, by diminishing managers’ ability to enrich them-
selves through a bargain repurchase, decreases their profits from each bargain re-
purchase, reduces the number of bargain repurchases, and makes it more difficult 
for them to gain from false signaling.  It then explains how these effects reduce 
managerial value diversion as well as improve payout decisions, increasing aggre-
gate shareholder value and benefiting public investors.  
 
1.  Reducing Managers’ Profits 
 
  The analysis of the proposed rule’s effects on managers’ profits from informed 
trading and false signaling  proceeds in three steps.  First,  I show that  pre-
repurchase disclosure reduces managers’ profits from any bargain repurchase they 
conduct. Thus, pre-repurchase disclosure would reduce managers’ profits even if 
the volume of bargain repurchases remains constant.  Second, I explain that, as the 
expected profitability of bargain repurchases declines, managers’ incentives to use 
repurchases for informed trading weaken, and the frequency of such repurchases 
drops. Pre-repurchase disclosure thus curbs managers’ bargain repurchase profits 
by both decreasing per-repurchase profits and lowering the total number of such  
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repurchases. Third, I show that, as the frequency of bargain repurchases drops, 
misleading repurchase announcements have a smaller effect on the stock price, re-
ducing managers’ profits from selling their own shares at an inflated price.  
 
      a. Profits Per Bargain Repurchase 
 
  As I explain below in more detail, pre-repurchase disclosure reduces manag-
ers’ expected profit from a contemplated bargain repurchase in two ways.  First, 
the rule increases the price at which the firm buys back shares during the bargain 
repurchase, reducing the immediate profit from the buyback.  Second, if managers 
conduct the bargain repurchase, market participants are more likely to believe that 
the firm’s future buybacks are also information-driven, even when they are not. 
Thus, if managers conduct the contemplated low-price repurchase, they are likely 
to face larger price increases in future buybacks – both those that are information-
driven and those that are not.  These expected price adjustments – both current 
and future  – reduce the anticipated profits from the contemplated bargain repur-
chase.     
  Pre-repurchase disclosure affects the repurchase price by communicating in-
formation about the likely value of the stock to the market before the repurchase is 
executed. To the extent market participants believe that the firm is attempting to 
buy back stock at a bargain price, they will bid up the price of the stock, forcing the 
firm to complete its repurchase at a less favorable price.    
  Before examining in more detail how a pre-repurchase announcement is likely 
to be interpreted by the market, it is worth considering how investors currently re- 
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spond to news about managers’ own trades. Market participants know that man-
agers often have inside information bearing on the value of their firm’s shares, and 
attempt to infer this information by studying managers’ behavior. For example, 
investors closely follow managers’ post-trading disclosures made pursuant to Sec-
tion 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which currently requires corpo-
rate insiders to report their trades by the end of the second business day after the 
trade date.160 Heavy net buying is often considered an indication that the stock is 
undervalued; heavy net selling is often interpreted to mean the opposite. Among 
the factors investors take into account in “decoding” a particular trade are the 
amount of the trade, the size of the trade relative to the insider’s holdings and pre-
vious trades, the degree to which the insider’s previous trades correlated with sub-
sequent stock price movements, and recent trades by other company insiders.161 
  In the same manner that market participants follow and respond to corporate 
insiders’ post-trading reports, investors and market makers will focus on a firm’s  
pre-repurchase announcements and attempt to interpret these announcements in 
light of the firm’s repurchase history and other relevant information. Has the firm 
tended to repurchase shares prior to abnormal stock price increases, or have the 
firm’s previous repurchases not correlated with future price movements? Is the 
repurchase  made  pursuant to a mechanical trading plan that was entered into 
years ago, in which case it is unlikely to be information-based? Or has the firm 
been repurchasing unusually heavily in recent months? The answers to these types 
                                                                                                                                                             
160  See Fried, Reducing the Profitability, supra note 11, at 324.  
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of questions, along with information about managers’ personal trading, will lead 
investors to adjust the terms on which they are willing to buy and sell shares. To 
the extent that the pre-repurchase announcement signals that the stock is likely to 
be underpriced, market participants can be expected to bid up the stock price. This 
forces the firm to trade at a less favorable price. 
  Of course, market participants can never know the exact motives for a particu-
lar repurchase order. As a result, the price adjustment following a pre-repurchase 
announcement will never precisely reflect the inside information (if any) behind a 
repurchase. Instead, the adjustment will capture the expected value of the inside 
information communicated by the announcement. Over time, however, the aggre-
gation of all these price adjustments will substantially reduce managers’ profits 
from  bargain repurchases.   
  Naturally, markets may not be completely efficient at absorbing information of 
the type transmitted by pre-repurchase disclosure.162 Even if information is dis-
closed substantially in advance of a repurchase, adjustments might be somewhat 
smaller than in a world of perfectly efficient markets. Nevertheless, a firm with a 
history of well-timed buybacks is likely to face substantial adjustments when it an-
nounces future repurchase orders. Over time, these adjustments are likely to sig-
                                                                                                                                                             
161 Id. at 323-25. 
162 See Wesley S. Chan, Stock Price Reaction to News and No-News: Drift and Reversal After 
Headlines, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 224 (2003) (summarizing studies suggesting that markets 
sometimes under-react to news).  Indeed, markets currently appear to under-react to the 
information contained in repurchase program announcements. See Ikenberry & Vermaelen, 
supra note 51.   
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nificantly reduce the value that managers can expect to transfer from public 
shareholders through bargain repurchases.  
    
      b. Frequency of Bargain Repurchases 
 
  As we have seen, pre-repurchase disclosure will reduce managers’ profits from 
each bargain repurchase. It will force managers indirectly to buy shares at a higher 
price when they conduct a bargain repurchase.  And it will force managers indi-
rectly to buy shares at a higher price in subsequent repurchases, even those that 
are not information-driven.  The anticipation of these price adjustments will re-
duce managers’ expected net benefit from conducting a bargain repurchase.  The 
prospect of lower profits will, in turn, make managers more reluctant to conduct 
certain bargain repurchases. As a result, pre-repurchase disclosure is likely to re-
duce not only the profitability of bargain repurchases but also their frequency.  
  Consider the following example. Suppose managers owning 10% of ABC Cor-
poration know that the stock is underpriced by 20%. They contemplate a repur-
chase of $1 billion worth of shares, which would yield $200 million of profit for 
non-selling shareholders if effected at the current price. Suppose also that the cash 
used for the repurchase could, if invested in the firm, generate $150 million more 
in earnings for shareholders than if it is distributed and invested by shareholders  
101 
outside the firm. The repurchase would therefore reduce aggregate shareholder 
value by $150 million. 163 
   In the absence of pre-repurchase disclosure, ABC’s managers have an incen-
tive to conduct the bargain repurchase even though it reduces aggregate share-
holder value by $150 million. The repurchase would cost managers their pro rata 
share (10%) of $150 million in foregone earnings, but yield managers their pro rata 
share (10%) of $200 million in insider trading profits. On balance, managers bene-
fit from this bargain repurchase even though it squanders cash and reduces aggre-
gate shareholder value.   
     Pre-repurchase disclosure makes managers more reluctant to undertake such 
a value-reducing repurchase.  Pre-repurchase disclosure  would  boost the stock 
price, reducing the d egree of underpricing and the amount of expected insider 
trading profits from this particular repurchase. Moreover, if the firm conducts this 
bargain repurchase, market participants are more likely to believe that future re-
purchases—whatever the motivation—are  information-driven, and thus bid up 
the price at which the firm must repurchase shares in the future. Over time, man-
agers and other non-selling shareholders will be forced to “give back” to the mar-
ket some or all of the $200 million in insider trading profits the managers hope to 
make with this particular bargain repurchase.  If managers expect these price ad-
                                                                                                                                                             
163  The $200 million of insider trading profits are zero-sum.  Managers and other non-selling 
shareholders make $200 million, but those selling stock to ABC lose an equivalent amount. As 
Part III.B explained, the $200 million gained by managers and non-selling public shareholders 
comes either directly or indirectly at public shareholders’ expense.  From an aggregate 
shareholder perspective, the profits from the bargain repurchase should therefore be ignored.  
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justments to be large enough, they will refrain from conducting the bargain repur-
chase. 
  Suppose, for example, that aggregate current and future adjustments are ex-
pected to force managers and non-selling shareholders to give back $100 million of 
the $200 million in insider trading profits. That is, the market is expected to be only 
50% efficient in “penalizing” ABC’s managers for this bargain repurchase. Given 
these expected adjustments, a repurchase of $1 billion worth of stock that is actu-
ally worth $1.2 billion will, over time, generate only $100 million of profits for 
managers and other non-selling shareholders. These profits will be less than the 
$150 million in profits foregone by squandering ABC’s cash on the repurchase. As 
a result, managers will have no incentive to engage in the bargain repurchase. In 
short, pre-repurchase disclosure will cause managers to abstain from certain bar-
gain repurchases that they currently have an incentive to undertake. Managers’ 
profits from bargain repurchases would thus decline for two reasons: (1) expected 
profits per bargain repurchase, taking into account both current and future price 
adjustments, would drop; and (2) the number of bargain repurchases would de-
cline. 
 
    c. False Signaling Profits 
 
  Pre-repurchase disclosure does not prevent managers from announcing that 
the board has authorized a repurchase program, even when they have no intention 
of buying back any shares.  However, it reduces managers’ ability to profit from 
inflated-price stock sales following misleading repurchase announcements.   Un- 
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der pre-repurchase disclosure, low-price buybacks are likely to become less com-
mon.  Accordingly, the probability that a repurchase program announcement is 
information-motivated is likely to be lower than it is now, and such an announce-
ment will send a weaker signal of underpricing. As a result, the market’s reaction 
to announcements by firms that their boards have approved share repurchase 
programs should be less positive. This, in turn, will make it more difficult for man-
agers to use misleading repurchase announcements to boost the stock price before 
selling their own shares. 
  As Part III.B.3 explained, there is a synergy between bargain repurchases and 
false signaling.  When managers undertake more bargain repurchases, the stock 
price reaction to repurchase announcements is stronger. It is thus easier for man-
agers to use misleading announcements to boost the stock price before unloading 
their own shares.   Thus, it should not be surprising that reducing managers’ ability 
to conduct bargain repurchases is also likely to reduce their ability to profit from 
false signaling.  
  To be sure, pre-repurchase disclosure would not completely eliminate it man-
agers’ ability to profit from misleading repurchase announcements to boost the 
stock price.  A repurchase announcement might cause the stock price to increase 
for reasons other than underpricing.  For example, market participants may be-
lieve that – if the firm actually follows through on the repurchase – it will distrib-
ute excess cash that managers have been hoarding. Managers will thus still be able 
to boost the stock price by announcing repurchase programs they have no inten- 
104 
tion of effecting, and then unload their shares. Nevertheless, pre-repurchase dis-
closure is likely to substantially reduce profits from such inflated-price sales. 164 
    
    2. Increasing Shareholder Returns 
 
  As Parts II and III explained, managers’ opportunistic use of repurchases and 
false repurchase announcements imposes costs on investors. Both bargain repur-
chases and inflated-price sales following misleading repurchase announcements 
systematically transfer value from public shareholders to managers. The use of 
bargain repurchases also adversely affects firm payout decisions, further reducing 
public shareholder returns.  
   By reducing managers’ profits from bargain repurchases, pre-repurchase dis-
closure increases public shareholders’ returns through two mechanisms.  First, it 
reduces the amount of value diverted from public investors to managers. Second, 
by reducing the frequency of bargain repurchases, pre-repurchase disclosure is 
likely to improve firm payout policy, increasing aggregate shareholder value.    
                                                                                                                                                             
164  One could reduce these profits further by requiring managers to disclose all trades in 
their firm’s stock  —both sales and purchases—in advance, as I have already proposed.  See 
Fried (1998), Reducing the Profitability, supra note 11.  This pretrading disclosure rule would 
reduce managers’ ability to directly profit from inside information when trading in their own 
firm’s stock.  In this particular setting, pretrading disclosure would make it much harder for 
managers to announce repurchase program solely to unload their own shares at the higher, 
post-announcement price. If managers disclose after the repurchase program announcement 
that they intend to sell shares, market participants would infer that the stock is likely to be  
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  We have seen that pre-repurchase disclosure curbs managers’ profits in three 
ways: by (1) reducing managers’ expected profits from each bargain repurchase 
through current and future price adjustments; (2) lowering the frequency of such 
repurchases; and (3) diminishing managers’ profits from false signaling. To the ex-
tent managers profit less from transactions in which the managers or their firms 
trade directly with public investors, public investors directly benefit. To the extent 
managers’ profits are made in the first instance at market makers’ expense, the re-
duction in  managers’ profits  will  enable market makers to lower their bid-ask 
spread,  indirectly  benefiting public investors.    Pre-repurchase disclosure thus 
benefits shareholders by reducing the extent of the value transfer to managers. 
  More importantly, pre-repurchase disclosure improves payout policy, increas-
ing aggregate shareholder value.  Because pre-repurchase disclosure reduces the 
profitability of bargain repurchases, managers will have less incentive to ineffi-
ciently hoard  cash  to give themselves the option of conducting bargain repur-
chases in the future. Managers will also have less incentive to engage in cash-
squandering bargain repurchases when they know that the current and future ad-
justments caused by pre-repurchase disclosure will substantially reduce their in-
sider trading profits from the bargain aspect of the repurchase. Managers will also 
have less incentive to use repurchases to distribute cash in situations where divi-
dends are more efficient for shareholders. As pre-repurchase disclosure mitigated 
these distortions, there would be more value available to shareholders as a group, 
                                                                                                                                                             
overpriced, or at least not underpriced, and bid the price down, forcing them to sell at a 
lower price and reducing their false-signaling profits.     
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including managers.  And, as will now explain, pre-repurchase disclosure can 
achieve these benefits at low cost.    
       
C. Costs 
 
  This Part considers three possible costs to pre-repurchase disclosure: that such 
a rule might (1) reduce the usefulness of repurchases; (2) cause managers to use 
dividends even when repurchases are more efficient, and (3) provide managers 
with a new  false signaling mechanism  for  selling their own shares at inflated 
prices. None of these costs, I show, is likely to be significant. 
 
  1. Impairing Benefits of Repurchases 
   
  Pre-repurchase disclosure will not interfere with any of the potential benefits 
of repurchases.  The rule would not affect the potential tax advantages of repur-
chases over dividends.  The mechanical costs associated with pre-repurchase dis-
closure – public dissemination of buyback orders and electronic transmission of the 
information to the SEC -- would be trivial.  Thus, pre-repurchase disclosure does 
not hinder the use of buybacks when a repurchase would distribute cash more tax-
efficiently or cost-effectively than a dividend.    Similarly, pre-repurchase disclo-
sure will not affect firms’ ability to use repurchases to provide shares for employee 
stock option programs. Finally, pre-repurchase disclosure will not impede the use  
107 
of repurchases to boost liquidity by, for example, stimulating trading and lowering 
market maker’s inventory holding costs.  
 
  2. Use of Inefficient Dividends 
   
  Although it should be clear that pre-repurchase disclosure would not impair 
any of the potential benefits attributed to repurchases, such as their ability to dis-
tribute excess cash tax-efficiently, one might worry that pre-repurchase disclosure 
would cause managers to use dividends when share repurchases would be more 
efficient.   In particular, the pre-repurchase disclosure required to effect a buyback 
might boost the stock price before the firm’s broker begins executing the buy order, 
causing the firm to acquire shares for more than the pre-disclosure price.  The an-
ticipated price adjustment could, in turn, discourage managers from distributing 
cash through repurchases even when  repurchases are more efficient for share-
holders than dividends. Instead, managers might distribute the cash through a less 
efficient dividend.  
    However, there may not be many circumstances in which repurchases are 
more efficient for shareholders than dividends. Because many shares are held in 
tax-free or tax-deferred accounts, dividends and repurchases are often taxed at the 
identical rate, and even outside of these accounts their tax treatment is, essentially, 
the same. And for large payouts, dividends are likely to involve lower transaction 
costs.  Thus, repurchases are likely to be more efficient only when a firm pays out 
small amounts of cash at a time.   
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  Moreover, in those situations where repurchases are likely to be more efficient 
– small payouts - managers are unlikely to be discouraged from distributing cash 
through repurchases.  Small buybacks cannot transfer much value to managers. As 
a result, market participants will understand that these repurchases are unlikely to 
be motivated by underpricing. Thus, they will not bid up the price and force the 
firm to buy the shares at a higher price.     
  Nevertheless, let us assume for argument’s sake that, in some cases, repur-
chases are more efficient for distributing large amounts of cash. Even in this situa-
tion, pre-repurchase disclosure is unlikely to prevent managers from efficiently 
distributing cash through a repurchase.   To begin, consider firms that, prior to the 
introduction of a pre-repurchase disclosure rule, tended to repurchase shares at 
their actual value.  That is, the firm’s repurchases had, on average, not preceded 
large run-ups in the stock price.   Market participants will bid up the stock price 
following a pre-repurchase disclosure only if they have reason to believe, based on 
the firm’s repurchase history and other factors, that the buy back is information-
driven. There is little reason to believe that, with respect to firms that have tended 
to buy shares at their actual value, the market will adjust the price in response to 
the disclosure of even a large repurchase order.    
  Next consider firms that, prior to the introduction of pre-repurchase rule, had 
a history of conducting bargain repurchases.  If managers do not take steps to sig-
nal that the contemplated repurchase is not information-driven, they are likely to 
face a significant adjustment when the repurchase order is announced.  However, 
managers can easily avoid – or at least reduce the size of – the market’s adjustment 
by committing to repurchase a certain number or dollar amount of shares every  
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period, regardless of the stock price.  On average, such a program will result in re-
purchases of shares at a “fair” price and, over time, not redistribute value among 
shareholders.  The market will infer from such a commitment that the managers 
are unlikely to be conducting a bargain repurchase and, accordingly, adjust the 
price less, if at all, in response to individual order announcements.165  As a result, 
managers who wish to distribute cash through a repurchase rather than through a 
dividend will not be deterred from doing so.   
  In sum, managers are likely to face price adjustments when they announce a 
repurchase order only to the extent that market participants believe, based on the 
managers’ repurchase history and other factors, including the size and structure of 
the order, that the buyback is information motivated. To the extent that managers 
have not used repurchases to indirectly buy stock for a low price, use repurchases 
to buy back small amounts of stock, or commit to repurchase according to a pre-
specified schedule, market participants will not respond to buyback orders by in-
creasing the stock price. Thus, managers wishing to use repurchases for share-
holder-serving purposes will not be discouraged from doing so.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
165 In 2000, the SEC promulgated  Rule 10b5-1, which creates a safe harbor from Rule 10b-5 
liability for a repurchasing firm that assigns repurchase decisions to a third party lacking 
access to material inside information. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2004). The safe harbor also 
extends to trades conducted according to a pre-arranged plan, a binding contract, or 
irrevocable instructions that were not created at a time when the firm’s management had 
material nonpublic information.  A firm acquiring stock under a Rule 10-b5-1 repurchase 
plan is unlikely to face much, if any, adjustment when individual purchase orders made 
pursuant to the plan are announced.  
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  3. Strategic Pre-Repurchase Announcements 
 
  We saw that managers not intending to repurchase a single share may cur-
rently have an incentive to announce a share repurchase program solely to boost 
the stock price before selling their own shares. These announcements tend to boost 
the stock price because many repurchases are information-driven. By reducing the 
frequency of bargain repurchases, pre-repurchase disclosure will reduce the sig-
naling strength of buyback program announcements.  In turn, managers will find 
it more difficult inflate the stock price by announcing repurchase programs that 
they have no intention to execute.  
  However,  one might worry that, under a pre-repurchase disclosure regime, 
managers may be tempted to conduct repurchases in the hope that the required 
pre-repurchase disclosure boosts the stock price, allowing them to sell their own 
shares at a price higher than the stock’s actual value. There is, however, an impor-
tant difference between current non-binding repurchase program announcements 
and the pre-repurchase disclosure rule I propose: pre-repurchase disclosure would 
be followed by an actual repurchase. Thus, an inflated-price repurchase will im-
pose a cost on managers to the extent that they continue to own stock in the com-
pany.  In effect, managers will buy sellers’ shares at a price above their actual 
value. Managers bear no such cost when they use a misleading repurchase pro-
gram announcement to boost stock price.   Thus, this manipulation strategy would 
be profitable  only if  the  managers sell more shares than they indirectly buy 
through the repurchase.      
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  In any event, the strategic use of repurchase orders to boost the stock price 
could easily be prevented.  In particular, managers of repurchasing firms could be 
required to disclose their own intended trades, or at least their sales, in advance – a 
rule that I have suggested be applied to managers whenever they trade in their 
own firms’ shares.166 Pretrading disclosure of repurchasing managers’ own trades 
would reveal to the market the net d irection of managers’ direct and indirect 
trades, allowing the market to draw appropriate inferences about the actual value 
of stock. This would eliminate managers’ ability to artificially boost the stock price 
by announcing repurchase orders. 
                                                                                                                                                             
166  See Fried (1998), supra note x.  
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Conclusion 
 
  Public companies in the United States and elsewhere are increasingly using 
open market repurchases, rather than dividends, to distribute cash to sharehold-
ers. This trend has generally been seen as desirable for shareholders. Stock buy-
backs may enable firms to distribute cash more tax-efficiently and cost-effectively 
than dividends. Repurchases can also be used to acquire shares for employee stock 
option plans and, under certain conditions, to increase liquidity.    
  This Article has shown, however, that managers also use repurchases to enrich 
themselves  at public investors’ expense.  Managers aware their stock is under-
priced frequently conduct repurchases to indirectly buy shares for themselves at a 
bargain price.   And managers announce repurchases they have no intention of 
conducting to boost the stock price, enabling them to unload their own shares at a 
higher price.   
  The use of repurchases for informed trading and false signaling imposes sub-
stantial costs on public investors. Managers’ profits from the opportunistic use of 
repurchases and misleading repurchase announcement may be as high as several 
billion dollars annually – all of which come, directly or indirectly, at public share-
holders’ expense.  Moreover, tying the firm’s payout policy to the stock price can 
distort managers’ payout and investment decisions, shrinking the size of the cor-
porate pie and further diminishing public investors’ returns. Managers’ ability to 
conduct bargain repurchases can lead to cash hoarding in some cases, cash squan- 
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dering in other cases, and the use of repurchases when dividends would be a more 
efficient distribution mechanism.  
  The Article has also proposed a new approach to regulating repurchases that 
would impair managers’ ability to use buybacks for informed trading and false sig-
naling: requiring a repurchasing firm to disclose the exact details of its buy orders 
before its broker executes them. Under a pre-repurchase disclosure regime, market 
participants will use disclosed repurchase orders to update their assessment of the 
stock’s actual value, taking into account the firm’s repurchase history, its financial 
condition, and managers’ contemporaneous trading. If the disclosure signals that 
the stock is likely to be underpriced, market participants will bid up the price of 
the stock before the repurchase order is executed, reducing managers’ profits from 
the bargain repurchase. Over time, these price adjustments will reduce managers’ 
profits from any given bargain repurchase and diminish the number of such re-
purchases.  Managers’ ability to use misleading repurchase announcements to sell 
stock at inflated prices will, in turn, decline.  Public shareholders’ returns will in-
crease as managers divert less value and the firm’s payout and investment deci-
sions improve.    
  The costs of pre-repurchase disclosure will be minimal.  Requiring firms to dis-
close their repurchase orders in advance will not undermine any of the potential 
benefits of repurchases, such as their ability to distribute cash more tax-efficiently 
than dividends or acquire stock for employee option programs. Nor will it cause 
managers to use dividends to distribute cash when repurchases would be more ef-
ficient. Regulators wishing to protect public investors and improve corporate pay- 
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out and investment decisions should therefore impose a pre-repurchase disclosure 
requirement on publicly traded companies.  